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Abstract 
 
 One of the most concerning trends associated with the ongoing problem of civil 
wars is that conflicts often flare-up a short period after they appeared to have ended. 
While significant progress has been made in the study of post-civil war peace building 
and the causes of civil wars, the tendency for civil wars to recur is one factor which has 
been largely overlooked. This thesis addresses this shortcoming by analysing the causes of 
recurring civil war using statistical methods. Relevant civil war research was consulted 
and hypotheses pertaining to the variables which might influence civil war recurrence 
were formulated. These factors are organised in a contingency framework which suggests 
that conflict recurrence is dependent on both pre- and post-conflict environments as well 
as factors associated with how the original conflict was fought. The Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program/Centre for the Study of Civil War Armed Conflict Dataset was used to produce a 
dataset of 238 civil wars which were fought between 1946 and 2004. Additional data 
pertaining to specific hypotheses was collected from a range of other sources. Statistical 
analysis was conducted to determine the strength and direction of relationships between 
different variables and civil war recurrence. Several factors were found to have a 
significant relationship with civil war recurrence: ethnic diversity, conflicts which were 
fought over territorial issues and conflicts which were not ended by military victory, 
particularly those which ended as a result of low or no fatalities. These findings are 
discussed with reference to improving civil war management and policy recommendations 
are presented.    
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Introduction 
 
Civil Wars and Recurrence 
 
 
“What’s so civil about war anyway?” 
Axle Rose 1990 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, the major security concern facing the world’s 
population has been civil war. During this time there have been hundreds of civil wars 
involving countries from all corners of the globe. Despite the overwhelming media attention 
focused on international terrorism, the costs of civil wars far outweigh those of even the most 
serious and widely publicised terrorist attacks. Civil wars have not only generated a frightening 
loss of life, both civilian and military, but also untold suffering and misery which result 
directly from the decline in living standards which are caused by most civil wars. As if the 
horrors associated with civil war were not bad enough, perhaps one of the most concerning 
features of civil wars is that their occurrence appears to increase a country’s susceptibility to 
additional civil conflict in the future. This creates what has been referred to as a “conflict trap”, 
where countries become trapped in a vicious cycle of recurring conflict (Collier et al. 2003). 
Despite this phenomenon, far more conflicts do not recur compared with those that do. This 
thesis will focus specifically on addressing the question of why some civil conflicts recur while 
others do not. The rationale behind this research is that once the factors which cause conflicts 
to recur are better understood, we will be better positioned to address the problem and prepare 
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strategies aimed at preventing conflicts from recurring. The research aims to isolate different 
variables correlated with civil war recurrence and use this information to develop practical 
responses to the barriers to permanent civil war settlement.  
This introductory chapter begins by broadly outlining the problems of civil war and the 
difficulties associated with attempting to resolve such conflict. It will then consider more 
specifically the problem of recurring civil war and discuss some of the most important 
literature related to the problem. Following this, the objectives of this research will be 
explained in greater detail with reference to the existing literature in the field. The remaining 
sections of the chapter will briefly outline the theoretical and methodological approach to this 
research; the data and other sources of information which will be utilised; the definitions of 
important concepts and the research limitations. The chapter concludes with an outline of the 
overall structure of the thesis.  
 
The Problem: The Recurrence of Destructive Civil Wars 
Since the end of the Second World War, over ten million people have died as a direct 
result of armed conflict. Of these fatalities just under eight million were caused by civil war; 
the remainder were a result of interstate conflict (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005). In the 50 years 
leading up to the Second World War approximately 27 million fatalities were generated in 
inter-state conflicts, while around 3.3 million fatalities were caused by civil war (Sarkees 2000). 
While these figures are generated from different datasets, they show a clear trend which is 
illustrated in Figure 1.1; inter-state conflict is becoming increasingly rare while civil conflicts 
are becoming the dominant form of violent conflict. Despite the ever-quoted suggestion that 
the end of the Cold War signalled the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992), conflict has 
continued to rage with well over 100 conflicts being recorded since 1989 (Gleditsch et al. 
2002). 
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Figure 1.1: The Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2004 
 
 
   Civil War     Internationalised Civil War      Inter-State War     Colonial Wars 
   Source: Harbom and Wallensteen (2005, p 625). 
 
Unfortunately, when considering the costs of civil war, the basic figures only tell a 
small part of the story. While considerably more difficult to calculate, the true cost of civil war 
is frighteningly high. To gain a better appreciation of the costs of civil war, Collier et al (2003) 
divide the costs of civil wars into three spheres; internal, regional and international. 
 
Internal Costs  
The internal sphere of civil war costs represents the mortality, displacement and 
poverty inflicted on the non-combatants within the country. The eight million fatalities 
generated by civil war since 1945 is an alarmingly high figure; however, it only accounts for 
the soldiers and civilians killed in actual combat (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, p 148). It does not 
account for the changes in social conditions caused by civil war such as famine, the spread of 
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infectious disease, physical and emotional exhaustion, destruction of infrastructure, economic 
losses, and increased military expenditure. 
The costs associated with civil wars do not end when the fighting stops. Economic costs 
such as high military expenditure, infrastructure repair and a lack of foreign investment will 
persist for many years after the conclusion of a civil war. Mortality and disability rates also 
remain high in the years following conflict. Furthermore, the health and economic costs of civil 
war are generally not compensated for by any post-conflict improvements in relevant policy 
areas and political freedom, in reality, both will generally deteriorate. Hence, the typical civil 
war will trigger a prolonged period of “development in reverse” (Collier et al. 2003, p 2).  
 
Regional and International Costs 
The second sphere of costs represents the spill-over effects of the conflict into 
neighbouring countries. The most obvious of these occurs when fleeing refugees cross into 
adjacent countries, often carrying infectious diseases such as malaria. Civil war also produces 
regional instability making surrounding countries less appealing in terms of foreign investment 
and tourism. Civil wars can also heighten the security concerns of neighbouring states resulting 
in the escalation of regional arms races.  
The third sphere of civil war costs represents the international ramifications of civil war. 
Civil wars create territories which are outside the control of any recognised government. This 
territory is not just the battleground for a civil war; it often becomes a safe haven for terrorist 
organisations and a breeding ground for the production and trafficking of drugs. Another 
global cost associated with civil war is the spread of AIDS caused by mass rape during warfare 
(Collier et al. 2003, p 2-3). 
Although there is some disagreement concerning the trends in the costs incurred by 
civil wars1 it is clear that civil war remains a dominant feature of the current international 
                                                 
1 Sarkees et al (2003) argue that the fatalities generated by civil war have remained relatively constant over the 
past 100 years while others, including Lacina and Gleditsch (2005), argue that fatalities generated by civil 
conflict have been in a state of decline since the end of the Second World War.  
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system. While often cited as the dominant security paradigm for the 21st century, terrorist 
attacks claimed just 4,805 lives in the first four years of the 21st century (Frey, Luechinger & 
Stutzer 2004); less than two per cent of the 268,800 lives claimed by civil war during the same 
time period (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005). Furthermore, addressing civil war also means 
addressing one of the root causes of international terrorism. As mentioned earlier, states are 
most vulnerable to falling into chaos immediately before, during or after conflict. When this 
happens, terrorism, narcotics trade, weapons proliferation, and other forms of organised crime 
can flourish (Krasner & Pascal 2005, p 153). It is not surprising that of the seven states 
suspected by George W. Bush in 2002 of housing terrorists, six have experienced civil  war  in 
relatively recent times: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, Iran and the Philippines (the other 
country being North Korea) (Bush 2002). Furthermore, 95% of the world’s hard drug 
production takes place in countries with a recent history of civil war (Collier et al. 2003, p 2). 
While there is some suggestion that the number of civil wars is reducing, the problem is 
by no means extinct. In early 2005 there were 30 active civil conflicts being fought in 17 
different countries around the world, 19 of which have already generated over 1,000 fatalities 
in their duration (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005, p 623; Marshall & Gurr 2005, p 79-83). Add 
to this a further 24 countries which were identified by Marshall and Gurr (2005) as being 
highly susceptible to an outbreak of conflict and over a quarter of the 161 countries with a 
population greater than half a million are either engaged in or highly susceptible to civil war. 
Hence, in the post-Cold War world, and the post-9/11 world, the major security concern facing 
the world’s population remains that of civil war. 
 
Civil War Resolution    
Civil wars have not only proven more common than inter-state wars but they have also 
proven to be considerably more difficult to resolve. Between 1940 and 1990, 55% of interstate 
wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas only 20% of civil wars reached similar 
solutions (Walter 1997, p 335). Instead, most internal conflicts have ended by way of 
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extermination, capitulation, expulsion of the losing side or mutual exhaustion of the relevant 
parties. The difficulty in reaching a mutually acceptable resolution in civil war has contributed 
to a high level of civil war recurrence with 36% of civil conflicts since 1946 being followed by 
additional conflict (Walter 2004, p 371). The resolution of civil wars provides one particular 
challenge distinct from inter-state conflicts; participants cannot simply retreat to their 
respective territories. Opposing factions must disband their forces and relinquish their only 
means of protection (Walter 1997, p 338). Combatants who have been “killing one another 
with considerable enthusiasm and success,” in some cases for a number of years, must learn to 
live together peacefully in the same territory (Licklider 1995, p 681). Herein lies one of the 
crucial problems of civil war and one of the major factors contributing to civil war recurrence.  
 
Recurring Civil War 
While civil wars are extremely costly and destructive, a second or third conflict 
breaking out while a country is still recovering from an initial conflict is a particularly daunting 
prospect. Using the very rudimentary measure of human fatalities, conflicts which recur are 
generally less severe than their predecessors (Gleditsch et al. 2002). However, given that 
countries which have recently experienced civil war will generally be in a state of disrepair as a 
result of the initial conflict, even a very minor subsequent conflict would be likely to have 
severe ramifications which extend well beyond basic fatality statistics. While avoiding civil 
wars as a whole is an extremely important objective, it is also important to ensure that existing 
civil wars and potential future conflicts do not recur. The fact that 36% of conflicts are 
followed by subsequent conflict means that 64% of conflicts do not recur. This raises a very 
important question; why do some conflicts recur while others do not? Before considering this 
question, it is first necessary to consider the progress which has already been made in relevant 
fields of civil war research.  
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Review of Current Perspectives on Civil War Management 
A large quantity of recent research into the causes of civil war has identified specific 
factors which make the outbreak of civil war more likely. A high probability of civil war has 
often been associated with factors such as a low level of economic development, sizeable 
ethnic diasporas capable of providing funding to rebel groups, thinly dispersed population, 
political instability, and a lack of state strength (Human Security Centre 2003). It is also 
frequently suggested that a history of conflict and recent involvement in a previous civil war 
not only increases the risk of civil war, but also augments other risk factors (Collier et al. 2003; 
Hegre 2003). While there is a reasonable level of agreement regarding the relationship between 
these factors and the emergence of civil war, the academic findings regarding the role of 
democracy and democratisation, the importance of natural resources, and the role of inequality 
and ethnicity are much more controversial (Human Security Centre 2003, p 6).  
As well as considering the causes of civil war, a considerable volume of literature has 
emerged which considers the circumstances in which peace settlements succeed and fail 
(Bekoe 2003; Bercovitch 1995; Hartzell 1999; Crocker & Hampson). Much of the literature 
which considers the stability of post-conflict environments focuses on the conditions prevalent 
in the post-conflict zone, particularly the nature of peace building efforts and peace agreements. 
These studies are relevant to this research as they enable comparison to be made between the 
factors associated with the failure of peace agreements and the factors associated with civil war 
recurrence.   
In spite of the progress which has been made in research on the stability of peace 
agreements and the factors that make countries susceptible to civil war, very little has been 
published specifically pertaining to the issue of recurring civil war. The major exception is 
Barbara Walter’s (2004) seminal study Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring 
Civil War. Walter’s article considers similar objectives to those which are considered in this 
research, the primary one being why some countries experience renewed civil war while others 
do not. Walter’s findings support her hypothesis that living conditions that favor individual 
   
  
  
  
8 
enlistment in rebel armies – namely low quality of life and barriers to political participation – 
help to predict which countries will continue to experience civil war and those which will not. 
The likelihood of returning to war is seen as both a function of the basic well-being of the 
country’s population and the accessibility of government decision-making to the average 
citizen (Walter 2004, p 385).  
 
Primary Objective 
The major focus of this research is to determine why some conflicts recur while others 
do not. My research aims to expand upon Walter’s (2004) research by making three major 
methodological changes. First, Walter’s research is based on the Correlates of War dataset 
which only includes conflicts which generated at least 1,000 fatalities (Singer & Small 1963). 
Conversely, my research will be based around the Peace Research Institute of Oslo and Centre 
for the Study of Civil War (PRIO/CSCW) Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). 
While similar in many respects to the Correlates of War dataset, the PRIO/CSCW Armed 
Conflict Dataset uses a considerably lower fatality threshold when defining civil war, and as a 
result includes a far greater number of cases. Using a dataset with a larger sample size not only 
means that more cases will be included in the study but will also increase the extent to which 
results can be generalised. Secondly, Walter’s research focuses on the post-conflict 
environment and living conditions and whether or not these conditions will provide the 
necessary motivation for individuals to reinitiate hostilities. This research will employ a 
broader approach which considers relevant variables prior to the outbreak of conflict, variables 
relating to the nature of the conflict and variables associated with the post-conflict environment. 
Finally, Walter’s research considers why countries are susceptible to recurring conflict of any 
sort, regardless of the participants or incompatibilities involved in the conflict. The objective of 
ending the cycle of civil war in general is an extremely important goal. However, where 
internal conflict is followed by another conflict within ten years, over 60% of the subsequent 
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conflicts involve the same factions and incompatibilities as the preceding conflict1. The sheer 
number of conflicts where the recurrence is essentially the same as the original conflict makes 
this issue worthy of independent analysis. While civil war does increase the risk of other 
conflicts of a different nature breaking out, the primary security objective following a civil war 
must be to ensure that the same mistakes are not made for a second time. Once a country has 
overcome the immediate threat of the same conflict recurring, they can then move toward 
addressing the factors which make the country susceptible to different civil wars in the future. 
Hence, this study will concentrate on addressing why specific conflicts involving the same 
participants and the same incompatibility recur.  
Once the causes of recurring civil war are isolated, a second goal of this research is to 
formulate policy advice to address this problem. At the end of 2005, there were 37 ongoing 
civil wars in 27 locations; these conflicts are shown in Figure 1.2 (Harbom and Wallensteen, 
2005, p 623). While it is critical that these conflicts be brought to an end as rapidly as possible, 
it is also important that any termination of hostilities is a permanent one. Along with these 
active conflicts, there are many other conflicts which have ended in recent years. The 
information derived from the analysis in this study can be used to prevent the recurrence of 
these recently ended civil wars as well as helping to bring current and future conflicts to a 
permanent conclusion.  
 
                                                 
1 Calculated using all conflicts included in the PRIO/CSCW dataset between 1945 and 1995 (Gleditsch et al. 
2002). 
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Figure 1.2: Location of Active Civil Wars (as of September 2005) 
 
 
 Source: Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen (2005)
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Additional Objectives 
A subsidiary goal is to link this research with the existing literature concerning the 
causes of civil war and negotiated settlements in civil war. Many of the studies considering the 
outbreak of civil war and the success of negotiated settlements share methodological 
similarities with the approach used in this research. Hence it makes sense to investigate the 
differences between the initial causes of civil war and the causes of recurring civil war. The 
differences between the academic findings regarding the breakdown of negotiated settlements 
and the recurrence of civil war can also be considered. As previously mentioned, the findings 
from this research will also be compared with those of Barbara Walter (2004). 
 
Methodological Approach and Theoretical Framework 
Early civil war research has traditionally been undertaken using a detailed, single study 
or case study approach. In more recent years there has been an upsurge in statistical studies 
which derive trends and generalisations from a large number of cases (see Collier & Hoeffler 
2005; Fearon 2004; Walter 2004). The primary purpose of this research is to establish trends 
and generalisations regarding the likelihood of civil war recurrence. The findings from a case 
study approach will only accurately apply to the case in question and will not necessarily 
provide information which can be applied to other or emerging civil wars. Given the number of 
different variables which might influence whether or not a conflict recurs, a statistical approach 
will allow consideration of a large number of variables and will provide the most accurate 
picture of what factors cause conflicts to recur. Hence, while both statistical and case study 
methods have their respective advantages and disadvantages, the increased predictive value of 
a statistical approach makes it the most logical methodology given the objectives of this 
research. 
This research will not test or expand an existing theory but instead aims to establish a 
new framework showing how different variables at the different stages of conflict relate to civil 
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war recurrence. From this information, practical ideas regarding durable and lasting conflict 
resolution will be derived. This framework will be based on Bercovitch’s Contingency Model 
of Conflict Mediation (Bercovitch & Wells 1993). Bercovitch’s Contingency Model was 
originally developed to assess how different factors influence the success of efforts to mediate 
conflicts. Given the similarity between those objectives and the purpose of this research it is 
logical to develop a Contingency Model to consider civil war recurrence. Bercovitch’s 
Contingency Model assumes that various antecedent conditions prior to mediation taking place 
will influence the way in which mediation is conducted. Subsequently, the way in which 
mediation is conducted will influence the extent to which the mediation was a success1. The 
Contingency Model formulated to consider civil war recurrence follows the same pattern as 
Bercovitch’s Contingency Model considering how factors at the antecedent and current level 
influence the likelihood of civil war recurrence. In this model, antecedent conditions will refer 
to conditions relating to how the original conflict was fought, the characteristics of the country 
in which the civil war was fought and the characteristics of any third party involvement during 
the conflict. The current conditions refer primarily to the way in which the original conflict 
ended, the nature of any military victory, and the involvement of third parties in any peace 
building initiatives. The consequent condition in this framework simply denotes whether there 
will be a relapse into conflict. Some of the different categories within the framework will be 
further broken down into more specific variables; this will be explained in greater detail in 
Chapter Three.  
The Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence (see Figure 1.3) will initially serve 
simply to provide a clear visual description of the hypothesised variables which might 
influence civil war recurrence at both the antecedent and post-conflict levels. Having tested the 
relationship between the variables in the initial framework (Figure 1.3) and civil war 
recurrence, those which do not have a substantial influence can be removed providing a clear 
picture of the variables which are most strongly correlated with civil war recurrence.  
                                                 
1 See Appendix A for a copy of Bercovitch’s Contingency Model of Mediation 
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Figure 1.3: Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence 
 
    Antecedent Conditions         Current Conditions            Consequent Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data and Sources of Information 
A large quantity of statistical research focusing on civil war and other forms of violent 
conflict has utilised data from The Correlates of War Project. The Correlates of War Project 
was established by David Singer (1963) and has created many datasets for use in the study of 
international relations including datasets considering inter-, extra- and intra-state war. The 
principal goal of the project is “the systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about 
war” (Singer & Small 1963). Working with the historian Melvin Small, Singer has established 
a definition of war which has been used in many subsequent studies. Singer and Small’s 
definition of civil war is composed of four phenomena (a) that military action was involved, (b) 
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the national government at the time was actively involved, (c) effective resistance (as measured 
by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides and (d) 
there were at least 1,000 battle deaths during the conflict. The Correlates of War dataset 
contains information such as the cause of the dispute, the number of conflict fatalities and how 
the dispute ended for all conflicts which meet this definition since 1816 (Singer & Small 1963).  
Under the directorship of Håvard Hegre, the Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research at Uppsala University (PRIO) and the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) (a 
division of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo) have collaborated in the 
production of a dataset of armed conflicts, both internal and external, in the period 1946 to 
present. This dataset contains similar information to the Correlates of War dataset, the major 
point of difference being that it uses a different definition of conflict. PRIO/CSCW define 
armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where 
the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Strand et al. 2005, pp 3-4). Given the considerably 
lower fatality threshold used in this definition, the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset 
contains a much greater number of cases. The PRIO/CSCW project has also developed datasets 
specifically related to conflict fatalities (Hegre 2005). This study will use the same definition 
of conflict as the PRIO/CSCW project and the PRIO/CSCW datasets will form the primary 
source of the data used in the research. The sample will consist of all of the conflicts in the 
PRIO/CSCW dataset which ended prior to 19941. Some of the data required to test the various 
hypotheses was already included in the PRIO/CSCW dataset, however other hypotheses 
required data to be collected from a number of other sources including other datasets and my 
own calculations. The details of where this data was sourced are provided in Chapter Four.  
 
                                                 
1 See Appendix B for a full list of the conflicts that are included in the analysis. 
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Research Limitations 
 As with any statistical study, the findings in this research are limited to the quality of 
the information used. Given that there are over 230 cases used in the sample for this analysis it 
is impossible to consider every case in detail. Instead cases were considered with reference to 
22 different variables which were predicted to have some influence on whether or not the 
conflict would recur. The variables which were tested were subject to the availability of 
information. In some cases there were variables of interest which may influence civil war 
recurrence yet these were not included in the analysis due to the availability of relevant data. 
For example, it was initially planned to include some measure of the intensity of post-conflict 
peace building efforts at the “current conditions” level of analysis; however, a measure of this 
variable was not readily available. Given the number of cases involved in this research it was 
not feasible to carry out detailed research on all the conflicts in the dataset to a level where the 
nature of post-conflict peace building efforts could be accurately coded, recorded and included 
in the analysis.  
 It is also important to remember that this research only considers why conflicts which 
are essentially the same recur; it does not consider conflicts arising over different issues or with 
different participants to be recurrences of civil war. It was initially planned to include two 
definitions of recurrence, one general, which included any civil war occurring within twenty 
years of a previous conflict ending as well as the more specific definition which has already 
been outlined where the incompatibilities and personnel involved in the conflict must be the 
same as in the previous conflict. Bearing in mind the time frame and resources available for 
this study, it was decided that the use of two definitions was too ambitious. Given that Walter 
(2004) has already considered the causes of recurring civil war using a general definition it was 
decided to focus this research specifically on recurrences of conflicts which are essentially the 
same and then compare the findings with Walter’s.   
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Structure 
 Chapter Two outlines the findings of existing civil war research and will provide the 
academic context of this research. It begins with an examination of the various methodological 
approaches to civil war research focusing on the pros and cons of different approaches. 
Following this there will be a review of the literature concerning some of the initial causes of 
civil war. Consideration of the factors which cause civil wars will focus around the “greed and 
grievance” argument, regime type, ethnic and cultural diversity, duration of conflicts, and the 
influence of peace building and negotiated settlements. Based on the information gathered 
from the consulted literature, 22 hypotheses regarding the relationship between different 
variables and civil war recurrence will be presented.  
 Chapter Three will consider in detail some definitions of the important terms used in 
this research, particularly the definition of a civil war and recurring civil war. The Contingency 
Model of Conflict Recurrence will also be expanded to include the specific variables which are 
considered in the research and the methodological approach used to analyse these variables 
will be introduced.  
 Chapter Four will present the findings revealed from the testing of hypotheses. Each 
hypothesis will be considered in turn covering three major points. First, the variables used to 
test the hypothesis will be described and the process by which they were collected will be 
explained. Secondly, the hypotheses will be tested using single variant analysis. This will be 
undertaken using Spearman’s Rank Order Correlations to determine the direction and the 
strength of the relationship between the independent variables (such as conflict fatalities) and 
the dependent variable (whether or not the civil war recurs). This analysis considers the 
influence of the variable that is being tested in isolation and assumes that all other factors are 
equal. Hence, although this analysis is useful, it only provides an indication of what causes 
civil war recurrence. Finally, the results of the Rank Order Correlations will be considered with 
reference to literature upon which the hypotheses were based. 
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 Chapter Five will apply multivariate analysis to the testing of hypotheses. In this 
analysis, variables are not tested in isolation but are instead considered in clusters where the 
influence of all variables is taken into consideration. Variables were grouped according to the 
categories shown in the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence then tested using Binary 
Logistic Regressions. The most significant results from each cluster were isolated and then 
tested again as a separate cluster to give the closest possible indication of what variables 
influence conflict recurrence. The findings from the multivariate analysis are divided into three 
categories. First, insignificant variables which have no or very little relationship with civil war 
recurrence. Secondly, intermediary variables which showed a noteworthy but not statistically 
significant relationship with civil war recurrence. Finally, significant variables, which showed 
a statistically significant relationship with civil war recurrence when tested using Binary 
Logistic Regression. All of the insignificant and intermediate variables were removed from the 
Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence leaving only the factors which are most strongly 
associated with civil war remaining as part of the model. The significant findings from this 
analysis are then discussed in greater detail with a focus on how the findings compare with 
previous research and how the findings might influence approaches to post-conflict peace 
building.  
 Chapter Six concludes this research by reconsidering the major questions and 
objectives of this study and by summarising the key findings of the research. Following this, 
two civil wars which have ended in the past ten years will be considered in an attempt to 
evaluate their relative risks of recurrence in light of the findings from this research. The 
findings from this research are also discussed with reference to improving post-conflict peace 
building and policy recommendations are presented. The study concludes by briefly 
considering how this research could be improved and discussing the importance of continued 
civil war research.    
   
  
  
  
18 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Current Perspectives Regarding Civil War and the  
Causes of Recurring Civil War 
 
 
Introduction 
 Unsurprisingly, given the devastation caused by civil war, a considerable quantity of 
academic work has been published which focuses on gaining accurate academic knowledge of 
the phenomenon. Despite the sizeable volume of literature which has emerged regarding civil 
war, there remain many unanswered questions and areas of debate. The purpose of this 
research is to address one such area; the problem of recurring civil war, by determining which 
variables will increase a conflict’s susceptibility to recurrence. The central purpose of this 
chapter is to formulate specific hypotheses which can be tested at the pre- and post-conflict 
levels of analysis.  
While several scholars have considered the problem of civil war recurrence, this 
research is unique in that it is the first which considers recurring civil war focusing specifically 
on the recurrence of conflicts which share the same characteristics as the preceding conflict. 
Hence, hypotheses will be based on existing research in similar fields including the causes of 
an initial outbreak of civil war, research considering the breakdown of negotiated settlements 
and peace agreements, and the causes of recurring civil war in general. Relevant ideas 
regarding conflict recurrence will be presented at the end of the chapter and incorporated into 
the Contingency Framework of Conflict Recurrence. This approach will enable consideration 
of the substantial progress which has already been made in the field of civil war research along 
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with introducing the background information on which the hypotheses tested in this thesis are 
based.  
The chapter will begin by briefly outlining the pros and cons of the two major 
approaches to civil war research and discuss the rationale for the use of a statistical approach. 
The remainder of the chapter will focus on the major areas of civil war research; the initial 
causes of civil war, the duration of civil war, negotiated settlements in civil wars and the 
problem of recurring civil war. From this literature, a series of hypotheses regarding civil war 
recurrence will be developed which will form the basis for the subsequent analysis in this study. 
 
Methodological Approaches to Civil War Research 
Most civil war research is undertaken using either case studies or statistical 
methodology. Both approaches have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The 
strengths of the case study approach can easily be identified; first, case studies enable the 
researcher to carry out detailed considerations of contextual variables which is often 
impossible in statistical studies. Secondly, case studies are more likely to reveal new variables 
which will often generate new hypotheses. Thirdly, case studies allow researchers to make 
inferences regarding causal mechanisms through the use of process tracing. These causal 
mechanisms can also be used to provide historical explanations of cases. Finally, the case study 
approach also allows the inclusion of complex causal relations which could not be 
accommodated by statistical studies. Case studies however are also prone to a number of 
problems. They are particularly susceptible to selection bias, can suffer from indeterminacy, 
and inevitably will lack a representative sample (Bennett 2004, pp 34-39). Conversely, 
statistical methods are also subject to several limitations, primarily their inability to provide the 
advantages of the case study approach such as the identification of new variables and the 
testing of historical explanations. However, statistical methods have the advantage of allowing 
estimation of the average explanatory effects of variables, the ability to analyse the 
representativeness or frequency of subsets of the data collected, and a high degree of 
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replicability when using the same data (Bennett 2004, p 45-46). The goal from this research is 
to establish general trends regarding civil war recurrence which can be applied to future 
conflicts. Hence, utilising a statistical approach will be far more beneficial than the case study 
approach. A more detailed description of the research methodology will be presented in the 
following chapter.  
 
The Causes of Civil War 
Many of the early studies concerned with the causes of civil war, including the likes of 
Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970), focused on relative deprivation as a cause of conflict. Relative 
deprivation illustrates the difference between an individual’s expectations and the actual 
performance and accomplishments that they experience. The frustration generated when 
political expectations are not matched by sufficient performance was thought to contribute to a 
willingness to rebel. Another early theory behind the causes of civil war is that inequality (a 
judgement resulting from comparison of an individual with others in society rather than ones 
own expectations) over either land or income can generate discontent, which when managed 
poorly by a government would produce rebellion (Muller & Mitchell 1987; Russett 1964). 
Both of these ideas, however, are based primarily on theoretical reasoning and the empirical 
evidence supporting them is not strong (Regan & Norton 2003, p 5). 
More recent research into the causes of civil war has revealed several more specific 
ideas relating to the conditions that contribute to the outbreak of civil conflict. A high risk of 
civil war has often been associated with the following factors: a low level of economic 
development, ethnic diasporas capable of providing funding to rebel groups, thinly dispersed 
population, political instability, and state strength (Human Security Centre 2003, p 6). It is also 
commonly suggested that a high incidence of conflict and recent involvement in a previous 
civil war not only increases the risk of civil war but also augments other risk factors (Collier & 
Sambanis 2002, p 7). While there is a reasonable level of agreement regarding the impact of 
these factors on the emergence of civil war, the academic findings regarding the role of 
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democracy and democratisation, the importance of natural resources, and the role of inequality 
and ethnicity are much more controversial (Human Security Centre 2003, p 6) and will now be 
discussed in greater detail. 
 
Economic Factors, Greed and Grievance and Natural Resources 
One of the most dominant lines of argument regarding the causes of civil war is the 
debate between “greed and grievance”. Traditionally, “grievances” such as a lack of political 
representation, ethnic or religious divisions or economic inequality have been suggested as 
important factors contributing to the outbreak of civil war. Until relatively recently, the few 
studies that focused on the economic dimensions of civil war have continued this trend 
focusing on the presence of economic grievances such as resource scarcity and economic 
deprivation. More recently, increasing academic attention has focused on the economic aspects 
of civil war, particularly the relationship between natural resource abundance and conflict and 
the self-financing nature of civil wars (Auty 2004; Ballentine & Sherman 2003; Berdal & 
Malone 2000; de Soysa 2002; Ross 2004a). 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) undertook statistical research on civil wars fought since 
1965 in an effort to determine which variables place a country at the greatest risk of civil war. 
The findings of this study did not support the traditional view of civil war being a result of 
genuine grievances. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) concluded that four factors increased the 
probability of civil war occurrence: low per capita income, natural resource exports (to a 
certain extent), large population and ethno-linguistic polarisation. Proxy variables for 
“grievances” such as ethnic diversity and political under-representation failed to show a 
noteworthy correlation with the outbreak of civil war. A number of reasons are presented as to 
why these characteristics provide motivation for rebellion. First, low per capita income 
increases the likelihood of rebellion success as the government has a lower tax income to spend 
on the military. Secondly, to a certain extent, the wealth generated by natural resource exports 
increases the probability of civil war as this provides rebel organisations with an incentive to 
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capture control of the state. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p 569) describe the relationship 
between natural resources and civil war as an “inverse U” because at a high level, natural 
resource exports begin to reduce the probability of civil war as they increase the wealth of the 
state and hence its ability to defend itself. Thirdly, larger populations will increase the 
probability of civil war because increasing population size is correlated with an increase in the 
number of secessionist movements. Finally, polarised societies are at greater risk of civil war 
because this reduces the difficulties of organising a rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler 1998, pp 564-
567).     
  In a more recent study, Collier (2000) places greater emphasis on the viability of a 
rebellion than the previous motive based explanation. Using a dataset of civil wars between 
1960 and 1999 his results again suggest that objective grievances have no direct link to the 
outbreak of civil war. Instead it was found that where natural resources are accessible, rebel 
groups will take advantage of large masses of uneducated youths in order to exploit such 
resources in an effort to increase their wealth. In order to muster support for such causes, rebel 
leaders will incite grievances so as to ensure group cohesion and organisation (Collier 2000, p 
850). Collier and Hoeffler’s “Greed and Grievance” thesis has produced considerable media 
attention and has influenced several noteworthy policy initiatives. For example, a United 
Nations endorsed initiative consistent with Collier and Hoeffler’s argument known as the 
“Kimberly Process” was commenced in May 2000 in an effort to end the trade in “conflict 
diamonds”1 (Fearon 2005, p 484). 
Following Collier and Hoeffler’s research, many recent studies have considered the 
relationship between natural resource wealth and civil war. The apparent relationship between 
natural resources (particularly oil, narcotics, timber, gemstones, gas and agricultural products) 
and civil conflict has been labelled by many as the “resource curse” (Collier & Hoeffler 2005; 
Dunning 2005; Pegg 2006; Ross 1999; Lujala et al. 2005). It is suggested that natural resources 
can promote conflict through several modes. First, the ability for elites to extract rents from 
                                                 
1 For further information see www.kimberlyprocess.com  
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natural resources might encourage rebels to use violence in an attempt to capture these rents. 
Rents from natural resources are commonly viewed as unearned and are particularly easy to 
embezzle; as a result, natural resource rents are often associated with corruption. This provides 
would-be rebels with a source of legitimacy when challenging the government. Additionally, 
states which have developed a dependency on unearned income tend to have fewer institutions 
that engage their citizens than states which are reliant on income from the taxation of their 
population. This lack of institutional structure can generate feelings of alienation and protest 
from citizens. Secondly, the distribution of wealth and employment generated by resource 
extraction often creates many grievances which could lead to armed conflict. Thirdly, 
economies that are dependent on natural resources are particularly susceptible to trade shocks 
and changes in the value of the resources they export. Should either of these phenomena occur, 
political dissatisfaction and instability often emerge. Finally, natural resources often lead to 
civil wars having a longer duration than would otherwise be possible if there were no resource 
rents to sustain the combatants. Furthermore, where conflicts are funded by natural resources, 
some participants will endeavour to “spoil” peace agreements as they stand to gain more from 
the continuation of conflict and hence the continued exploitation of resources (Humphreys 
2005, pp 26-39).  
As a result of the apparently wide-ranging means by which natural resources can 
promote conflict, a large number of studies have been conducted which empirically analyse the 
relationship between conflict and natural resources. These studies have produced variable and 
often contradictory findings. For example, as mentioned earlier, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) 
argue that there is an “inverse U” relationship between the percentage of a state’s GDP which 
is made up of natural resource exports and the likelihood of civil war occurrence. Contrastingly, 
using a different dataset, Fearon and Laitin (2003, p 87) concluded that the share of primary 
commodity exports in GDP has no significant correlation with civil war. In a more recent study, 
using the same civil war codings and the same model specifications but using different systems 
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of analysis, Fearon (2005, p 503) concluded that the “correlation between primary commodity 
exports and civil war outbreak is neither strong nor robust”.    
In an effort to clarify the findings regarding natural resource exports and civil war 
occurrence, Ross (2004b, p 338) considered the results of fourteen different studies that 
address the natural resource-civil war relationship. Four common conclusions which hold true 
in most cross-national studies of civil war were established. First, the presence of oil increases 
the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; secondly, ‘lootable’ commodities like 
gemstones and drugs tend to lengthen existing conflicts; thirdly, there is no apparent link 
between legal agricultural commodities and civil war; and finally, the association between 
primary commodities – a broad category that includes both oil and agricultural goods – and the 
onset of civil war is not robust. Ross (2004b, p 338) also revealed an equally large number of 
questions regarding natural resources and civil war which remain the centre of debate: 
“whether or not natural resources influence the onset of conflict; 
whether or not resources influence the duration of conflict; whether 
resources influence all types of civil wars or only a subtype, e.g. 
ethnic or separatist conflicts; whether all types of resources, or only 
a subset (e.g. oil, diamonds) are linked to conflict; and what causal 
mechanisms link resources to conflict”. 
 
Regime Type 
The relationship between regime type and civil war is another important theme in the 
study of civil war. Debate in this area has focused around two factors: the nature of the 
political system (democracy versus autocracy), and the degree of stability in the political 
system. An initial consideration of the relationship between regime type and civil war 
occurrence would most likely generate the conclusion that democratic countries are less likely 
to experience conflict than countries with non-democratic political systems. The very nature of 
democratic government appears to be conducive to non-violent means of conflict resolution: 
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“Democratic political systems are supposed to allow all parties to a 
conflict to be heard, decisions are made on the basis of rules all 
parties to the conflict agree to, open debates and a free press ensures 
that the decision-making is transparent, and the losing party in 
contentious issues is willing to comply with the outcome because the 
democratic constitution guarantees that the party may prevail in the 
future” (Hegre 2003, p 1). 
In one of the more comprehensive studies of this relationship, Hegre et al (2001) ranked 
states on a scale ranging from highly democratic to highly autocratic. It was found that states in 
the middle range of this scale were most susceptible to civil war while states with consolidated 
democracies or autocracies had a significantly lower risk of civil war (Hegre et al. 2001, p 42). 
Semi-democratic or semi-autocratic regimes promulgate enough repression to produce 
grievances and protest yet are also open enough to allow disaffected parties to organise and 
rally against the government. Conversely, highly autocratic governments are so repressive that 
opposition groups struggle to gain momentum and for the reasons listed above, civil war in 
highly democratic societies is also unlikely (Hegre et al. 2001, p 33). In similar studies 
considering the relationship between democracy and civil war occurrence, other scholars 
including Fearon and Laitin (2003), Muller and Weede (1990), Ellingsen (2000), and Reynal-
Querol (2002) have found evidence of this inverted U-curve relationship where civil war is 
most likely to occur in countries with a mid-spectrum regime type.  
 Regime stability has also proven to be an influential factor in determining the risk of 
civil war outbreak. Political change in either direction (toward democracy or autocracy) creates 
conditions ripe for rebellion (Hegre et al. 2001, p 34). When authoritarian regimes collapse, 
states usually lack the institutional resources to establish a new political system with the level 
of accommodation typical of established democracies, hence generating the potential for ethnic 
or ideological conflict (Gurr 1970, p 165). If the change is toward increased authoritarianism 
the erosion of political institutions will generate increased repression which, when coupled 
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with weak institutions, is a key catalyst for violence (Zanger 2000, pp 226-227). Empirical 
testing has shown that changes in the nature of a regime clearly increase the risk of civil 
conflict in the short term (Hegre et al. 2001, p 42).  
 
Ethnic and Religious Diversity 
It is often suggested that the proliferation of civil conflicts, particularly those since the 
end of the Cold War, are a result of ethnic and religious antagonisms (Fearon & Laitin 2003, p 
75). There are a number of theories which account for the prevalence of ethnic conflict. Some 
suggest that ethnicity is an exceptionally strong affiliation which as a result “charges 
interethnic interactions with the potential for violence” (Sambanis 2001, p 263). In other cases 
it is suggested that ancient group hatreds based on memories of past atrocities make ethnic 
conflict difficult to avoid. Similarly, the clash of cultures theory suggests that irreconcilable 
differences create fear and insecurity which leads to violence. Despite the quantity of 
theoretical ideas providing rationale for ethnic conflict, empirical research has not uncovered 
clear evidence of a correlation between ethnic cleavages or inequalities and conflict. Fearon 
and Laitin (2003, p 75) considered the prevalence of civil war since the end of the Second 
World War using a dataset of 127 conflicts and concluded that when per capita income was 
held constant “it appears not to be true that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity – or 
indeed any particular cultural demography – by itself makes a country more prone to civil war”. 
The major factor contributing to the outbreak of civil war in this research was per capita 
income, with a reduction of $1,000 in per capita income equating to a 41% increase in the 
likelihood of civil war (Fearon & Laitin 2003, pp 82-83). Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) findings 
are generally consistent with other studies of a similar nature1, including Collier and Hoeffler 
(2001) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2001). 
                                                 
1 The exception being that other studies (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002) have found that 
ethnic polarization is correlated with the outbreak of civil war, this trend was not present in Fearon and Laitin’s 
(2003, p 75) analysis.  
   
  
  
  
27 
Rather than actual ethnic differences or inequalities, Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
concluded that the opportunity and ability to wage an insurgency or rural guerrilla warfare 
were more relevant factors in determining the likelihood of civil war occurrence. Factors which 
increase the feasibility of guerrilla warfare such as mountainous terrain, high population, a 
large number of young males and potential support from neighbouring states were all found to 
increase the risk of civil war (Fearon & Laitin 2003, pp 85-86). These findings were similar to 
those of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who also found that factors which provide an opportunity 
to wage a rebellion such as substantial natural resource exports, a thinly dispersed population 
and low per capita income (making the recruitment of rebels less expensive) is much more 
likely to generate a civil war than traditional grievances associated with the outbreak of civil 
war such as inequality, political rights, and ethnic or religious diversity.   
The findings of both Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) support 
the theory that conflicts often appear to be based on ethnicity as a result of entrepreneurs or 
elites pursuing private interests by taking advantage of existing ethnic networks. Elites will 
sometimes manipulate ethnic identities to reinforce societal cleavages in such a way as to 
produce sources of friction and conflict which will provide a more legitimate façade to disguise 
the less virtuous motivations behind the conflict (Sambanis 2001, p 263).  
Civil war research which has considered the role of psychological factors as causes of 
civil war also discounts ethnicity as a primary cause of civil war and instead suggests that 
motivations such as personal vengeance and the opportunity to settle old scores are often root 
causes of civil conflicts. Citing many examples from various civil wars, Kalyvas (2000, pp 12-
14) argues that personal conflicts or family feuds are often misinterpreted as a reflection of 
other cleavages in the conflict. 
 
Geography and Conflict  
The aforementioned studies which focus on ethnicity as a potential cause of civil war 
have all revealed that to some extent geographic factors will influence the risk of civil war. 
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High population, mountainous terrain, thinly dispersed population and a potential sanctuary for 
rebels in neighbouring states all increase the risk of a state being exposed to civil war. The 
importance of geography in interstate war has long been recognised with significant early 
contributions coming from theorists including Mahan (1918), Spykman (1944), Mackinder 
(1919), and Haushofer (1942). However, the literature which investigates the impact of 
geographic variables on civil war is relatively sparse. In one of the few articles which 
specifically considers the influence of geographic factors on civil war, Buhaug and Gates 
(2002) reveal several interesting trends. First, rebels with the goal of seceding from the state 
tend to fight further away from the capital than groups attempting to seize control of the state 
(Buhaug & Gates 2002, p 428). Secondly, rebel groups with an ethnic or religious identity will 
also tend to fight further away from the capital than other groups. Thirdly, civil war zones 
which are adjacent to an international border will be larger than conflicts whose battle zone is 
not bordered by another state. Interestingly, Buhaug and Gates’ hypothesis that mountainous or 
forested terrain would produce larger conflict zones was not supported (Buhaug & Gates 2002, 
pp 429-430). 
 
Duration of Conflicts 
Along with the causes of civil war, considerable attention has focused on the duration 
of civil wars and why some conflicts last longer than others (DeRouen & Sobek 2004; Fearon 
2004b; Filson & Werner 2002; Regan 2002). On average, a civil war will last around seven 
years (Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004, p 253) while an interstate war will have a duration 
of approximately 11 months (Bennett & Stam 1996, pp 254-255). Obviously, the greater the 
duration of a conflict the greater its destructive potential meaning that reducing the duration of 
conflicts is an important issue for policy makers. A number of studies have considered both 
theoretically and empirically what factors influence the duration of a civil war.  
Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004) consider the factors which influence the 
duration of civil wars using a dataset of 77 large-scale conflicts. Three characteristics were 
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shown to lengthen conflict: low per capita income, high inequality, and a moderate degree of 
ethnic division (two or three major ethnic groups). Two key factors which shortened the 
duration of conflicts are a decline in the prices of the primary commodities that the country 
exports and an external military intervention on the side of the rebels (Collier, Hoeffler & 
Soderbom 2004, p 268). Interestingly, Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004, p 266) did not 
find any significant correlation between forested or mountainous terrain and the duration of 
civil wars. Historically, it was found that conflicts in the 1980’s and 1990’s were likely to be of 
a longer duration than earlier conflicts, possibly as a result of rebels obtaining easier access to 
international markets where they can sell goods and purchase military equipment (Collier, 
Hoeffler & Soderbom et al. 2004, p 268). 
In a similar study using a dataset of 128 civil wars between 1946 and 2000, Fearon 
(2004b) revealed some interesting trends regarding the duration of civil wars. Conflicts 
involving rurally based guerrilla bands operating in close proximity to international borders 
have been particularly difficult to end, especially when these conflicts involve what Fearon 
(2004b, p 277) refers to as “sons of the soil dynamics” where land or natural resource disputes 
arise between a peripheral ethnic minority and state-supported migrants of a dominant ethnic 
group. Furthermore, conflicts in which rebel groups have access to funds from contraband such 
as opium, diamonds, or coca also tend to have a longer duration. Conversely, anti-colonial 
wars and civil wars arising out of coup attempts and popular revolutions are usually quite brief 
(Fearon, 2004b, p 277). 
 
Peace Building, Negotiated Settlements and Civil War Recurrence 
Many of the studies which have considered the causes of civil war have suggested that 
previous involvement in civil war or other forms of violent conflict will greatly increase a 
country’s vulnerability to further conflict. Historically, 36% of civil conflicts since 1946 have 
been followed by additional conflict (Walter 2004, p 371). Bearing this relatively strong 
correlation in mind, there is surprisingly little in the way of literature which specifically 
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considers why some wars recur while others do not. Much of the literature which considers the 
stability of post-conflict environments focuses on the conditions prevalent in the post-conflict 
zone, particularly the nature of peace building efforts and peace treaties.  
Peace building activities can be divided into four categories, first, monitoring or 
observer missions which have the purpose of monitoring a truce or peace agreement though the 
presence of observers. Secondly, traditional peacekeeping, which involves the deployment of 
military and civilian personnel as consented to by all the parties in an effort to facilitate the 
settlement of a conflict. Thirdly, multidimensional peacekeeping which is designed to 
implement a full negotiated peace agreement and introduce a number of strategies to promote 
self-sustaining peace. A final form of peace building is peace enforcement which usually 
involves a multilateral military intervention designed to impose public order by force, with or 
without the consent of the host government (Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 781). The success of 
such peace building initiatives has been described as “mixed at best: occasional successes in 
restoring a legitimate and effective government are matched by striking failures to do so” 
(Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 779). 
Zartman (1995b, pp 269-273) argues that reconciliation is dependent on four key 
factors. First, power structures need to be organised effectively. In order to accomplish this, 
some form of temporary agent is needed at the top to provide a structure within which 
institutions can gradually emerge. In conjunction with this, both powerful rebels and more 
legitimate civic leaders need to be brought together so that they both have a stake in the 
peaceful settlement of the dispute. Secondly, it is important to increase state legitimacy through 
constructive participation and support from society. Thirdly, the state’s ability to extract and 
reallocate resources must be restored. Without the generation of resources the state will be 
unable to begin reconstruction and overcome problems of neglect and misallocation which lie 
at the root of many conflicts. In order to ensure that all three areas, power, participation and 
resources, are successfully maintained during a post-conflict period, external assistance is 
“advantageous if not necessary” (Zartman, 1995b, p 272). 
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Having recognised the importance of external involvement in peace building initiatives, 
Sambanis and Doyle (2000) have considered what types of interventions are most likely to 
produce lasting peace agreements. They argue that three factors will influence the durability of 
a post-conflict settlement; the economic and social capabilities of the state, the availability and 
extent of external assistance, and the level of residual hostility from the conflict. Centred on 
these factors, Sambanis and Doyle (2000) test the influence of a number of proxy variables on 
the success of peace building initiatives. The findings of this research are particularly relevant 
to the causes of recurring civil war as it is likely that factors which contribute to the collapse of 
peace processes will be similar to those which cause periods of peace to subside back into 
conflict. Five proxy variables were used to measure war related hostility: the number of 
fatalities and displaced persons resulting from the conflict, the type of conflict, the number of 
factions involved in the conflict, the level of ethnic division, and the outcome of the conflict. 
Several important ideas regarding the resolution of civil wars were revealed. With regard to the 
quantity of deaths and displacement, it was found that peace building initiatives were less 
successful in conflicts of a high intensity. It was thought that higher fatalities and suffering 
caused by the conflict would increase feelings of resentment and the desire for revenge, hence 
making the conflict more difficult to resolve. Identity wars were significantly negatively 
correlated with peace building success (Sambanis & Doyle 2000, pp 787-789). Identity wars, 
especially ethnic conflicts, are particularly intractable because ethnic identity is a very 
powerful association, depending on “language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, 
as well as parentage, which no one can change” (Kaufmann 1996, p 138). Higher numbers of 
factions were also found to have a significant negative correlation with peace building success. 
It is suggested that this is a result of an increased number of potentially divergent positions 
which makes it particularly difficult to produce a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict 
(Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 785). This finding concurs with similar lines of reasoning 
hypothesised by scholars considering the international system such as Deutsch and Singer 
(1964), Waltz (1964) and Selten (1973)  (cited in Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 785). 
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The one key factor which was found to be beneficial to peace building was an outcome 
where the conflict ended in the signing of a treaty (as opposed to military victory or informal 
truce). It was suggested that this showed that participants in the conflict at least had some 
motivation to move toward resolution (Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 785). Conflicts of a longer 
duration were also found to be correlated with successful peace building, probably as a result 
of exhaustion which generated a genuine desire to resolve the conflict. This finding, however, 
was not as statistically robust as others mentioned.   
In a similar study, Hartzel, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) also consider the factors that 
determine a successful civil war settlement. They suggest that the factors which influence civil 
war settlement can be divided into two broad categories: the settlement environment and the 
features of the settlement agreement. The settlement environment refers to factors such as the 
characteristics of the country in which the civil war takes place, the international environment, 
and the nature of the actual civil war itself. The features of the settlement agreement include 
factors such as the stability of post-war institutions and the types of protections offered to 
various groups (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, p 187). Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 
(2001) use a dataset of 41 civil conflicts which were ended by some form of negotiated 
settlement between 1945 and 1998 to test how different variables within these categories 
influence the likelihood of a negotiated civil war settlement breaking down within five years of 
the negotiations taking place. The success of a settlement was measured by the number of 
months of peace which followed the signing of the settlement.  
The influence of three variables which relate specifically to the nature of the civil war 
were tested: the duration of the conflict, the intensity of the conflict (measured by the mean 
number of fatalities per month), and the nature of the issues at stake in the civil war. It is often 
suggested that conflicts over identity issues are particularly difficult to resolve as the stakes are 
higher and non-divisible. For these reasons Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001, p 189) 
hypothesised that negotiated settlements would be less likely to fail in politico-economic 
conflicts than in identity-based conflicts. In contradiction to Sambanis and Doyle’s (2000) 
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findings, the issue at stake in the conflict was not found to have a significant influence on the 
success of peace settlements. This is probably because the security concerns following a civil 
war would be the same regardless of the causes of that conflict (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 
2001, p 199). It was also suggested peace agreements would be less successful in conflicts of a 
high intensity due to the increased feelings of insecurity which accompany high losses of life. 
This hypothesis was supported; a strong positive correlation between conflict intensity and 
settlement failure was found. The final variable associated with the nature of the conflict is the 
duration of the conflict. In contrast to the intensity of the conflict, it was suggested that 
settlements of longer conflicts were more likely to be stable as longer conflicts allow the 
disputants sufficient time to assess their relative strength. As the duration of a conflict 
lengthens parties are more likely to believe that they are unable to prevail in the conflict and 
hence settlement becomes an increasingly desirable outcome. This hypothesis was also 
supported (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, pp 188-199). 
Two factors associated with the nature of the settlement agreement were found to 
increase the likelihood of settlement success: agreements which provided some form of 
territorial autonomy between the competing factions and settlements which included provisions 
for third party enforcement. Regarding the nature of the state in which the settlement is made, 
it was found that peace settlements are more likely to succeed in countries with a history of 
democratic government. Surprisingly, it was revealed that the variable associated with the 
international environment had little impact on success of peace settlements; post-Cold War 
settlements were no more successful than others (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001).  
In one of the few articles which specifically considers recurring civil war, Walter (2004) 
argues that rather than factors associated with the previous war or the nature of the settlement, 
the most important factors in civil war recurrence are those related to rebel recruitment: 
“Rebel leaders do not have the luxury to call on a standing army or 
forcibly conscript citizens should grievances or opportunities for 
rebellions arise. Instead, they must recruit and remobilise soldiers for 
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each individual campaign. This places the onus for renewed war on 
ordinary people and the trade-offs they must make for returning to war 
or staying at peace, and their decision to enlist or not enlist is likely to 
be based on very personal cost calculations. The attributes of a 
previous war may matter, but civilians are not going to transform 
themselves from shopkeepers back into soldiers unless the conditions 
that exist at any given point in time encourage this transformation” 
(Walter 2004, p 374). 
Walter (2004) suggests that the conditions most likely to encourage citizens to commit 
to rebellion are extreme individual hardship which is considered to be worse than the risk of 
death in combat and the perception that violence is the only means by which citizens can 
improve their individual position. Using data collected from the Correlates of War dataset, 
Walter (2004) compared the prevalence of factors associated with the previous conflict and 
factors relating to the post-conflict living conditions to determine which had the most influence 
on civil war recurrence. Two important findings were revealed. First, recurrence of a civil war 
is influenced by the characteristics of the previous civil war. Longer wars were significantly 
less likely to recur and conflicts which were ended in the partition of a country were 
significantly more likely to recur (Walter 2004, p 379). Like Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 
(2001), Walter (2004, p 379) suggests that longer conflicts will recur less frequently “because 
resources and support have been depleted or because better information on relative capabilities 
and resolve is available to potential combatants”. Conflicts which end in partition are more 
likely to recur as government concession of territory promotes additional challengers to pursue 
their own demands1 (Walter 2004, p 374).  
Factors of note which Walter found to have no significant influence on civil war 
recurrence were the intensity of the conflict (measured in either total fatalities or fatalities per 
                                                 
1 Bearing in mind the fact that Walter (2004) uses a broad definition of recurring civil war where participants and 
incompatibilities do not have to be the same as in previous conflicts. While partition does reduce the likelihood of 
further civil war involving the same combatants, it does increase the risk of further civil war in general. 
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month), whether or not the key issues in the conflict were resolved, whether or not the conflict 
ended in a decisive victory for one side and whether the conflict was fought over total or non-
total goals (Walter 2004, p 380). A second major finding in Walter’s research is that post-
conflict living conditions do have an impact on civil war recurrence. A number of quality of 
life indicators such as infant mortality and adult illiteracy are significantly correlated with civil 
war recurrence. Contrastingly however, level of democracy was not found to significantly 
influence the likelihood of a civil war recurring (Walter 2004, p 382). 
 
Potential Causes of Recurring Civil War  
 The preceding pages have discussed the major fields of civil war research. Relative to 
other aspects of civil wars the problem of recurring civil war has been somewhat neglected. 
This research will consider recurring civil war focusing on the recurrence of conflicts which 
have the same characteristics as preceding conflicts. While this is the first time that this 
specific problem has been addressed, the literature consulted in this chapter has uncovered 
several theoretical concepts which can be applied to conflict recurrence. These concepts form 
the basis of the specific elements of the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence and the 
hypotheses which will be analysed.   
The hypotheses regarding civil war recurrence fall into several broad categories which 
will make up the basis for the theoretical framework used in this study: the characteristics of 
the original conflict, the geographic and ethno-political characteristics of the country in which 
the conflict was fought, the nature of any third party involvement in the conflict, and the 
characteristics of the post-conflict environment. The remainder of this chapter will briefly 
outline the specific hypotheses that will be analysed within each of these categories. 
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Conflict Characteristics: How the Original Conflict was fought 
Conflict Fatalities 
When considering recurring civil wars, Walter (2004) found no significant correlation 
between the intensity of an original conflict and the likelihood of that conflict recurring. 
However, the findings of studies that have considered the breakdown of negotiated peace 
settlements contradict this result. Sambanis and Doyle (2000) and Hartzell, Hoddie and 
Rothchild (2001) have both found that peace settlements are more likely to break down in 
conflicts of greater intensity. Both studies suggested that conflicts of a high intensity would be 
more likely to produce entrenched emotions such as resentment and revenge making the 
conflict particularly difficult to resolve. Additionally, Kalyvas (2000) has found that personal 
revenge is a primary motivation for individuals to re-enter a civil conflict. Bearing this in mind, 
it is suggested that the higher the loss of life in a civil war, the greater the level of grievances 
and chance of subsequent war. These ideas form the basis of the first two hypotheses to be 
tested in this study:  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Conflicts with higher total fatalities will be more likely to recur than those 
with lower fatalities. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Conflicts of a higher intensity will have a greater probability of recurring. 
 
Conflict Duration  
Given the nature of hypothesis one, it might seem obvious that longer conflicts generate 
higher fatalities and hence would be more likely to recur. However, Hartzell (2001), Smith and 
Stam (2003), and Walter (2004) have all found that conflicts of a longer duration are less likely 
to recur. Physical and resource exhaustion and improved knowledge of an opponent’s relative 
strength are put forward as explanatory factors for this phenomenon.  
HYPOTHESIS 3: Protracted conflicts will be less likely to recur than shorter conflicts. 
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Number of Factions 
When considering how the number of factions influences the prospects of international 
co-operation, Oye (1985, p 19-20) suggests three reasons why a greater number of factions will 
make co-operation difficult. First, an increased number of actors will make the identification of 
common interests more difficult. Secondly, anticipating the behaviour of other actors becomes 
increasingly difficult due to the increased number of factors influencing each party’s behaviour. 
Thirdly, deterrence is less effective as retaliation might destabilise the entire system. As a 
result, groups may be tempted to ‘free-ride’ and not genuinely co-operate. Sambanis and Doyle 
(2000) have tested the idea that a greater number of factions will make co-operation more 
difficult with relation to the success of peace building initiatives in civil war. They found that 
there was a negative relationship between the number of factions involved in a conflict and the 
success of peace building initiatives. However, they also found evidence to suggest that as very 
high numbers of factions emerge, peace building prospects are improved. Given that only one 
conflict, of the 238 conflicts considered in this research, included more than five factions, this 
finding will not be considered.  
HYPOTHESIS 4: A greater number of factions involved in a civil war will increase its 
susceptibility to recurrence.   
 
Incompatibility  
Most literature concerning post-conflict stability classifies conflict incompatibilities as 
either identity based or politico-economic based. Identity conflicts are thought to be more 
difficult to resolve as they involve powerful emotional affiliations which are very difficult, and 
in some cases impossible, to change (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001; Lake & Rothchild 
1996; Sambanis & Doyle 2000). The data used in this research uses two classifications of civil 
war incompatibilities: conflicts which arise over territorial issues and conflicts which arise as a 
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result of competing claims for the control of government. It is suggested that identity issues are 
more likely to be attached to territorial conflicts than to conflicts arising over competing claims 
for the control of government. Given that identity based conflicts are more difficult to resolve 
it is hypothesised that territorial conflicts will be more susceptible to recurrence. Additionally, 
in conflicts arising over competing claims for the control of government the victor will almost 
inevitably gain control of most mechanisms of the state. This would give them considerable 
advantage in being able to deter future attacks making conflict recurrence less likely. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Conflicts which arise over territorial issues will be more likely to recur than 
those over competing claims for the control of government. 
 
Episode of the Conflict 
This hypothesis considers the relationship between the number of times that a particular 
conflict has occurred and civil war recurrence. Conflicts which recur on multiple occasions 
will result in increased fatalities generating issues of distrust and revenge. However, the 
recurrence of a conflict also means that the combined total duration of the conflict increases 
and will most likely expose the country to extreme hardship, especially given that the state is 
already in recovery from an initial conflict. It is suggested that the additional hardship caused 
by recurring civil war will mean that civil wars in either their second or greater episode will be 
less likely to experience recurrence. Complex modelling undertaken by Smith and Stam (2003) 
has suggested that in the event of one conflict leading to a subsequent conflict, the higher the 
cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the subsequent conflict. Hence, hypothesis six 
may only apply when the previous conflict is of a sufficient duration or intensity. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: The likelihood of conflict recurrence reduces with each additional episode of 
a civil war. 
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The Geographic Characteristics of the Conflict 
Proximity of the Conflict to an International Border 
 Buhaug and Gates (2002) have revealed some interesting trends regarding civil conflict 
and geography; in particular, that conflicts which take place adjacent to an international border 
are likely to be larger than those that do not. Furthermore, Joes (1996, p 6) suggests that in 
order for a guerrilla army to be successful they must have a neighbouring country where they 
can seek sanctuary and store vital supplies. Hence, it would seem likely that when a conflict 
takes place in close proximity to an international border, rebels can retreat into foreign territory 
meaning they are better equipped to re-initiate hostilities at a later date. 
HYPOTHESIS 7: Civil wars which are fought in close proximity to an international border 
will be more likely to recur. 
 
The Terrain and Isolation of the Battle Zone 
Successful guerrilla warfare is also dependent on the ability of rebels to establish secure 
bases, usually in inaccessible areas a considerable distance from major population centres in 
mountainous or heavily forested terrain (Joes 1996, p 6). Fearon and Laitin (1999, p 4) have 
shown that conflicts are more likely to break out in rough terrain, particularly hills and 
mountains, however they have not yet developed a concise coding for different terrain types. 
Rather than attempting to develop a coding for different terrain, it was decided to simply 
measure the distance between the conflict epicentre and the nearest major city under the 
assumption that rough terrain will be more common in areas isolated from major population 
centres. Isolated conflicts will experience similar problems to those close to an international 
border, enabling rebels to disperse and hide before regaining strength and re-initiating 
hostilities. 
HYPOTHESIS 8: Civil wars which are fought in isolated areas a considerable distance from 
major population centres will be more likely to recur. 
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The size of the Country and the Size of the Battle Zone 
 It is argued that isolated environments where rebels can retreat and regroup will be 
more common in countries with a larger land area. Hence, conflicts which occur in larger 
countries will be more likely to recur as rebel forces will be more capable of finding sanctuary 
within their country meaning that the achievement of total victory over the opposition will be 
more difficult. This research will also investigate whether the size of the battle zone (and the 
size of the battle zone relative to that of the country’s land area) influences civil war recurrence. 
It is suggested that conflicts with a smaller battle zone will be more susceptible to recurrence. 
HYPOTHESIS 9: Conflicts are more likely to recur in countries which have a larger total land 
area.   
HYPOTHESIS 10: Conflicts which have a smaller radius will be more likely to recur.  
HYPOTHESIS 11: Civil wars which have a smaller radius as a fraction of their land area will 
be more likely to recur.  
 
Characteristics of the Country in which the Civil War Takes Place 
Regime History and Stability 
As discussed earlier, civil war outbreak is not directly associated with highly autocratic 
regimes. Instead, empirical research has shown that civil war is most common when the 
governing regime is neither highly democratic nor highly authoritarian. Similarly, conflict is 
also thought to be more common in countries where there is instability in the type of ruling 
regime, characterised by rapid movement toward or away from democratic governance.  
HYPOTHESIS 12: Civil wars which take place in a country with a mid-range regime type will 
be more likely to recur than those which are highly democratic or highly autocratic.  
HYPOTHESIS 13: Regime instability will increase countries’ susceptibility to conflict 
recurrence. 
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Ethnic Diversity 
Greater ethnic diversity alone has not proven to be a decisive factor in the causes of 
civil war. For this reason it is suggested that ethnic diversity will not have a substantial 
influence in determining whether or not a conflict recurs. 
HYPOTHESIS 14: Ethnic diversity will not significantly influence civil war recurrence.  
 
Total Population  
Collier and Hoeffler (2001, p 13) have found that the risk of civil war is roughly 
proportional to population size suggesting that a larger population improves the feasibility of 
waging a rebellion as there are more potential rebel recruits.     
HYPOTHESIS 15: Higher population levels will increase susceptibility to civil war recurrence.  
 
Population Density/Distribution  
Collier and Hoeffler (2001, p 5) also suggest that low population density and low levels 
of urbanisation will inhibit government capability and increase the risk of civil war outbreak. It 
is assumed that lower population density and urbanisation will make it more difficult for a 
government to maintain checks over their population in the post-conflict environment, hence 
increasing the opportunity for rebels to re-initiate conflicts. 
HYPOTHESIS 16: Countries which have lower population density will be more likely to 
experience recurring civil war.  
HYPOTHESIS 17: High rural population figures will make civil war recurrence more likely.   
 
The Nature of any Third Party Involvement in the Conflict 
Foreign Intervention  
Walter (2002) has found that a crucial factor in the success of civil war peace 
settlements is a third-party security guarantee. Combatants will only relinquish military assets 
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if they can do so without risking a surprise attack during the de-mobilisation process. In order 
to achieve this they will seek a security guarantee from a third party; this will sometimes come 
in the form of third party observations which provide the disputants with accurate information 
as to their opposition’s compliance. However, a more common third-party security guarantee 
involves the third party having the necessary force to deter either party from launching an 
attack during the peace building process (Walter 2002, pp 26-27). It is suggested that the 
intervention of a third party in a civil conflict will have a similar effect and reduce the 
probability of civil war recurrence. In order for a third party to involve itself in a conflict it 
must clearly have an interest in that conflict ending in a certain way. While this will not 
necessarily be a resolution that both parties accept, the additional strength added to one side by 
a third party will sufficiently deter the opposition from re-initiating the conflict.  
HYPOTHESIS 18: The intervention of a third party during a conflict will reduce the 
probability of conflict recurrence.  
The influence that a third party intervention will have is largely dependent on their 
power and legitimacy, hence major powers or highly respected international organisations are 
much more likely to deter future escalations than less capable groups.  
HYPOTHESIS 19: The extent to which a third party will reduce the likelihood of conflict 
recurrence is dependent on their power. 
 
Post-Conflict Conditions 
Means of Resolution 
The outcome of a conflict is also likely to influence whether it will recur. Where a 
conflict ends in a decisive victory for one party, a resumption of that conflict is thought to be 
less likely for two reasons. First, a comprehensive victory will send a message to other 
potential challengers that they will face stiff opposition if they choose military confrontation. 
Secondly, the victor in a civil conflict generally gains full control of the state which allows 
them to consolidate their power, particularly their strength relative to opposition groups in 
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society (Wagner 1993, 1994; Zartman 1989, 1995a, cited in Walter 2004, p 374). A conflict 
which is ended by the signing of some form of treaty is also less likely to recur. While it would 
be extremely premature to assume that the signing of a treaty means that the conflict has been 
resolved permanently, it does show that the combatants have at least some desire to move 
toward resolution (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003; Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 785).   
HYPOTHESIS 20: Conflicts which end as a result of a decisive military victory will be less 
likely to recur.  
HYPOTHESIS 21: The means by which a conflict ends will influence its likelihood of 
recurrence. 
 
United Nations Peacekeeping  
Literature concerning the success of the United Nations (UN) as a peacekeeping force 
reveals that historical peacekeeping operations have had mixed results; however the weight of 
literature suggests that their overall influence is a positive one (Fortna 2004). 
HYPOTHESIS 22: UN Peacekeeping will reduce the chances of civil war recurrence 
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Chapter Three 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Approach 
 
 
Introduction 
 In the final section of the previous chapter, a number of hypotheses regarding civil war 
recurrence were introduced. This chapter will provide an outline of the methodological 
approach that will be used to organise and analyse these hypotheses. It will begin by 
establishing a clear definition of civil war along with the criteria used to determine whether or 
not a civil war is classified as having recurred. These definitions are particularly important as 
they determine which cases will be included in the analysis and hence play a major part in 
determining the results of the research as a whole. Following this, the contingency framework 
around which this research is based will be introduced in greater detail. The chapter will finish 
by providing a more detailed description of how the variables included in the framework will 
be examined. 
 
Defining Civil War 
 In order to effectively investigate the causes of recurring civil war, it is first necessary 
to establish a clear definition of what exactly constitutes a civil war. There are a diverse range 
of datasets which are currently being used in the study of civil war which use a range of 
different parameters to define civil war. Three themes which are common to most definitions 
of civil war can be identified. First, the conflict must involve some form of challenge to a 
state’s sovereignty. Secondly, one of the disputants must be an agent of the state and the other 
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must be a non-state organisation. Thirdly, each side in the conflict must sustain some 
proportion of the total fatalities generated in the conflict (so as to exclude genocide and mass 
murder) (Collier & Hoeffler 1998; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Licklider 2003; Sarkees 2000; Strand 
et al. 2005).  
One of the major points of difference between the various definitions of civil war 
centres on the threshold of violence used to differentiate civil wars from other types of violence 
(Sambanis 2004, p 815). The use of fatality thresholds in civil war definitions is contentious as 
it tends to create bias against conflicts in countries with a small population which do not meet 
the threshold but are of substantial importance to the country in which they occur. A potential 
solution to this problem is the use of a ratio of deaths per head of population. However, this 
generates further problems as conflicts of high regional importance in larger countries such as 
China and India would often be excluded due to a seemingly low national importance (Human 
Security Centre 2003, p 2). A threshold of 1,000 fatalities per year was introduced by Singer 
and Small (1963) in their seminal Correlates of War dataset. This threshold has been used in a 
number of subsequent studies (see Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Licklider 2003) and also forms the 
basis of definitions used in other studies (see Fearon & Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004).  
Along with the issue of a fatalities threshold, difficulties are also encountered when 
determining which types of violence should be coded as civil wars. For example, when 
considering the Correlates of War dataset, the Dhofar Rebellion which began in 1964 in Oman 
is not included as it does not meet the threshold of 1,000 battle fatalities, despite the fact that it 
was a highly organised uprising. Conversely, the rebellion in Somalia in 1991 is included in 
many datasets because it produced such high fatalities, despite the fact that there was neither a 
recognised government or an organised rebel force (Human Security Centre 2003, p 1). Other 
problems with classification include the differentiation between civil conflicts and other forms 
of internal violence such as terrorism, politicide and genocide (Human Security Centre 2003, p 
1).   
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In an effort to avoid inconsistencies in civil war datasets, a number of new datasets are 
being formulated using different classifications of violence. Wolfgang Schreiber (2003) and 
other scholars from Hamburg University have established a dataset that uses no threshold 
number of deaths but rather estimates the sustainability of violence. Other datasets such as The 
State Failure Project (Marshall & Gurr 2003) and the Political Terror Scale (Cornett & Gibney 
2003) have moved toward categorising internal conflicts along a continuum based on a more 
holistic analysis of levels of political violence.    
The definition of civil war used in this research is the same as that used by the 
Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (PRIO) and the Centre for 
the Study of Civil War (CSCW). PRIO/CSCW define civil conflict as a “contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths”  (Strand et al. 2005, p 3). The individual elements of this definition can 
be broken down further in order to give a more precise meaning to the definition. “Armed 
force” refers to the use of manufactured and natural weapons to promote a party’s general 
position in a conflict. An opposition organisation is defined as any non-governmental group of 
people having announced a name for their group and using armed force (Strand et al. 2005, p 
3-4). 
The threshold of 25 fatalities is definitely low, especially when compared with the 
threshold of 1,000 fatalities per year as used in the Correlates of War dataset (Singer & Small 
1963). The creators of the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset argue that a threshold of 
1,000 fatalities is too high as it excludes important cases such as the Basque conflict in Spain 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002, p 617). As a result, they decided to set the fatality threshold at 25 so as 
to ensure that all politically significant events were recorded without cluttering the dataset with 
exceedingly small incidents (Gleditsch et al. 2002, p 617).  
There are three major reasons behind the decision to use the PRIO/CSCW definition of 
civil war and dataset in this research. First, given the large number of small states in the 
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international system, a conflict which produces 25 fatalities will represent a very significant 
incident in many smaller states. Secondly, the lower fatality threshold used in the PRIO/CSCW 
Armed Conflict Dataset generates more cases so is better suited to statistical analysis. Finally, 
given the extent of globalisation in today’s world, relatively small episodes of violence can 
have profound effects throughout the world. For example, recent violence in East Timor which 
would probably fail even to meet the threshold of 25 fatalities has thrown the entire country 
into turmoil and has attracted a UN mandated peacekeeping force composed of troops from 
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal.  
 
Definition of Recurring Civil War 
 Having established a concise definition of civil war, it is now necessary to determine 
what classifies as a recurring civil war. Accomplishing this requires a clear conception of 
when a conflict begins and ends. The obvious answer to this question is that a conflict begins 
when the killing commences and ends when the combatants stop killing one another. When 
considering recurring civil war however, this simple rule is not always sufficient. Several 
questions remain: how long must a cessation in fatalities last in order for a resumption of 
hostilities to be classified as an entirely new conflict and what characteristics must a conflict 
exhibit in order for it to be classified as a recurring civil conflict? 
 In this research, a conflict begins according to the criteria set out in the PRIO/CSCW 
Armed Conflict Dataset. The start of a conflict is recorded as the first year in which fatalities 
reached at least 25 and ends in the final year where at least 25 fatalities result from the conflict 
(Strand et al. 2005, p 11). This research uses a strict definition of what constitutes a recurring 
civil war. It was originally planned to also use a broader definition which would have allowed 
a comparative analysis between recurrence of a specific conflict and recurrence of conflict 
within a country in general. However it was decided that this was beyond the scope of the 
research and hence the focus of the research should concentrate specifically on recurrences 
which met a stricter definition.  
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Definition 
A civil war is deemed to have recurred if the original conflict ends (fatalities failing to 
reach 25 in a year) and recurs (25 fatalities are recorded within a year) within ten years of the 
original conflict ending. The broad issue at stake in the conflict must be the same as in the 
original conflict and at least one of the non-governmental opposition factions must be the same 
as in the previous conflict. The separate elements of this definition will be operationalised 
further:  
Between one and ten years of peace (where fatalities fail to reach 25):  
Most civil war lists will specify an arbitrary period of time such as two or five years in 
order for a conflict to be classified as ended (Fearon 2004b, p 279). Given the relatively low 
fatality threshold used in this research, it was decided that one year in which fatalities failed to 
reach 25 would be a reasonable indication that the conflict had come to some form of 
conclusion. In order for a conflict to be classified as recurring, the second outbreak of violence 
must occur within ten years of the final year of the original conflict. The ten year time-frame 
was selected because if a conflict recurs after a period of more than ten years, even if the 
organisations and the issues are the same, there will probably be a new generation of soldiers 
involved in the fighting. Therefore, it is likely that the conflict would have acquired a different 
meaning to the original conflict at its commencement.  
Both the incompatibility and the non-governmental factions must be the same: 
In this definition the incompatibility (the root cause of the conflict) must be the same as 
in the preceding conflict. Additionally, at least one of the non-governmental factions which 
fought in the original conflict must also participate in the subsequent conflict. Essentially, this 
means that any recurrence of a conflict must effectively be the same as the preceding conflict. 
The requirement that at least one of the opposition groups must have been a combatant in the 
preceding conflict does have some disadvantages. In many conflicts the opposition group 
changes its name, but the personnel and organisation of the group remains essentially 
unchanged. Due to the difficulties of detecting where this has occurred there may be some 
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cases where conflicts have recurred and for all intents and purposes are the same as the 
preceding conflict yet are not included in this analysis as recurring conflicts. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 The framework used to analyse the problem of recurring civil war has already been 
introduced in the introductory chapter of this work. It is based on Bercovitch’s Contingency 
Model of Conflict Mediation (Bercovitch & Wells 1993) which was originally developed to 
assess how different factors influence the success of efforts to mediate violent conflicts1. The 
framework, as used in this research, stipulates that conflict recurrence is a factor of a number 
of pre-existing contextual conditions in existence prior to the outbreak of the conflict, factors 
relating to how the civil war was fought, and variables pertaining to the post-conflict 
environment. The dependant variable which this research aims to explain is whether or not a 
civil war will recur. The contingency model (see Figure 3.1) specifies clusters of independent 
variables which are assumed to have some influence on civil war recurrence. Each of the 
independent variables in Figure 3.1 pertains to at least one of the hypothesised ideas regarding 
civil war recurrence which were presented in the latter part of the previous chapter. 
‘Antecedent’ conditions refer to the pre-existing conditions inherent in the country in which the 
conflict takes place and the nature of the conflict which has already occurred. As shown in 
Figure 3.1, the clusters of antecedent variables are grouped according to characteristics of the 
conflict, geographic features of the battle zone, characteristics of the state in which the conflict 
took place (ethno-political factors) and the nature of any third party involvement in the conflict. 
The ‘current conditions’ in this framework represent the variables associated with the way in 
which the original conflict came to an end and the post-conflict environment. It is argued that a 
combination of antecedent conditions and current conditions will be influential in determining 
whether or not a conflict will recur. If the conflict does recur then the historical aspects of the 
conflict will influence the likelihood of any subsequent conflict recurrence. This relationship is 
                                                 
1 For a full copy of Bercovitch’s Contingency Framework, see Appendix A. 
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shown in Figure 3.1 by the arrow connecting civil war recurrence with antecedent conditions. 
The box entitled “other variables” is included simply to acknowledge that variables other than 
those included in the framework may also influence the likelihood of civil war recurrence.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence 
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The contingency model provides a clear organisational framework which enables the 
consideration of factors which make civil war recurrence more or less likely in an empirical 
fashion and can be reproduced using different data and variables. Following the analysis of the 
independent variables, insignificant variables will be removed from the framework so as to 
leave only the most relevant factors.  
 
Methodology 
 The pros and cons of using a statistical methodology in the study of civil war were 
discussed in the previous chapter. While it is clear that both approaches have distinct 
advantages, a statistical approach is clearly better suited to this research given that the primary 
objective of the research is to produce a set of general rules regarding civil war recurrence 
which can be applied to future conflicts. Hence, the independent variables shown in the above 
framework will be tested using a large number of cases selected from the PRIO/CSCW Armed 
Conflict Dataset.  
Civil wars from version three 1  of the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset were 
selected and then divided into those cases which had recurred and those which had not. The 
PRIO/CSCW dataset includes all civil wars which meet their definition (see page 46) that were 
fought between 1946 and 2004. Given that conflicts were only classified as non-recurring if 
they were followed by at least ten years of peace, conflicts which ended after 1994 could not 
be included in the analysis as “non-recurring conflicts”. This is because the PRIO/CSCW 
Armed Conflict Dataset is only updated to the end of 2004, meaning that it is impossible to 
show whether conflicts which ended after 1994 have been followed by ten years without 
recurrence. All other conflicts from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset were included 
generating a list of 238 conflicts, 83 of which had recurred on at least one occasion and 155 
                                                 
1 Since the commencement of this research, a fourth version of the Armed Conflict Dataset has been published 
that has been updated to include information for the year 2005. 
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which were isolated incidents1. Having obtained a suitable sample of conflicts, a number of 
explanatory variables (one for each hypothesis) were added to the dataset with the aim of 
finding evidence in support of the hypotheses set out in the previous chapter. While some of 
these variables were simply copied from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset, others were 
collected from a range of different sources. The details of how each variable was 
operationalised and collected will be outlined in the following chapter along with the results of 
the single variant analysis. Chapter Five will then consider how different variables relate to 
civil war recurrence when they are tested in clusters using binary logistic regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 For a full list of the conflicts included in this analysis, see Appendix B. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Analysis of Individual Variables 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The primary focus of this chapter is to investigate a series of hypotheses regarding civil 
war recurrence (see Chapter Two, pages 36 – 43). Hypotheses will be discussed according to 
the different subheadings listed in the Contingency Framework of Conflict Recurrence (see 
Figure 4.1).  
Each hypothesis will be considered in turn covering three major points. First, the 
variables used to test the hypothesis will be operationalised and the process by which they were 
collected will be described. Secondly, hypotheses will be tested using single variant analysis. 
Spearman’s Rank Order correlations will be used to determine the direction and the strength of 
the relationship between the independent variables (such as conflict fatalities) and the 
dependent variable (whether or not the civil war recurs). Significant correlations (p = >0.05) 
are marked with an asterisk. This analysis considers the influence of the variable that is being 
tested in isolation and assumes that all other factors are equal. Hence, although this analysis is 
useful, it only provides an indication of the relationship between different variables and civil 
war recurrence. A more realistic explanation can be generated through multivariate analysis 
(which considers the impact of a number of variables simultaneously) which is undertaken in 
the following chapter. Finally, the results of the Rank Order Correlations will be considered 
with reference to the literature upon which the hypotheses were based.  
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Figure 4.1: Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence 
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recurs (Walter 2004, p 373). Variables relating to how the original conflict was fought form 
one of the important categories of antecedent variables in the framework of analysis used in 
this research. The way in which the original conflict was fought will influence both intangible 
and concrete motivations for re-initiating or avoiding future conflict. For example, the nature 
of some conflicts might leave combatants particularly eager to seek revenge while conflicts of 
a different nature might leave former combatants physically incapable of resuming hostilities. 
Six variables pertaining to the nature of the original conflict will be examined: the number of 
fatalities, the intensity of the conflict, conflict duration, the number of competing factions, the 
cause of the conflict, and the episode of the conflict. These variables provide a broad 
description of how conflicts were fought and will enable us to show whether particular types of 
violence are more susceptible to recurrence than others.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Conflicts with higher total fatalities will be more likely to recur than those 
with lower fatalities.  
HYPOTHESIS 2: Conflicts of a higher intensity will have a greater probability of recurring. 
To test these hypotheses, data on the total fatalities in all conflicts was collected from 
Lacina and Gleditsch’s (2005) Battle Deaths Dataset. This dataset includes statistics on 
fatalities in all of the conflicts included in the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset and was 
produced in conjunction with the Centre for the Study of Civil War. The fatalities recorded in 
this dataset are referred to as “combatant deaths” and are defined as “all people, soldiers and 
civilians, killed in combat” (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, p 148). This is distinct from what 
Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) refer to as combatant fatalities and war fatalities. Combatant 
fatalities are defined as “the number of battle connected fatalities among military personnel” 
(emphasis added) (Sarkees 2000, cited in Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, p 128). Conversely, war 
fatalities refer to “all people killed in battle as well as all those whose deaths were the result of 
the changed social conditions caused by the war” (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, p 4). While each 
of these definitions has important uses, they both suffer from problems which limit their use 
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when trying to determine the scale and nature of a conflict. Combatant deaths do not provide 
an accurate measure of the scope of a conflict given the nature of modern conflict where the 
lines between civilians and soldiers are often blurred. On the other hand, war deaths provide a 
better indication of the total suffering caused by a conflict, however the classification is 
problematic; it is nearly impossible to determine whether or not certain problems which often 
occur in conjunction with civil war such as disease and famine would have occurred in the 
absence of the conflict (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, p 147-149).  
 Total battle fatalities were calculated by adding together the fatalities from each year of 
the conflict as recorded in Lacina and Gleditsch’s dataset. Given that the duration of the civil 
wars in this dataset ranged from one to 44 years, the total fatalities in a conflict only provides a 
partial representation of the nature of the conflict. A conflict which generated 10,000 fatalities 
but had a duration of just one year will have a vastly different complexion to a conflict which 
generated 10,000 fatalities over the course of 20 or 30 years. For this reason it was decided to 
also investigate the relationship between the intensity of a conflict and recurrence. Conflict 
intensity was calculated by dividing the total fatalities in each conflict by the duration (in years) 
of the conflict.  
Due to the considerable variation in the number of fatalities (ranging from 25 to over 
two million) and the presence of some distorting outliers, the data regarding both total fatalities 
and conflict intensity was transformed by taking the square root of each figure. Using this data 
the mean fatalities in recurring conflicts equalled 53.9 while in non-recurring conflicts they 
equalled 79.6. There is a very weak negative correlation between higher levels of fatalities and 
a lower likelihood of civil war recurrence [r= -.051, n= 238, p= .433]. The mean intensity of 
recurring conflicts equalled 26.8 while in non-recurring conflicts it was 83.9. Similarly, there is 
also a weak correlation between higher conflict intensity and a lower chance of conflict 
recurrence [r= -.104, n= 238, p= .108]. 
These results do not support the hypotheses that greater fatalities and intensity will 
increase the likelihood of civil war recurrence. The weak relationship which is revealed with 
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both variables is the opposite to the proposed hypotheses which were based on the rationale 
that conflicts which generated higher fatalities would create deeply entrenched resentment 
making conflicts more difficult to resolve and more likely to recur. Instead, these findings 
suggest that increased intensity and fatalities might generate military, physical and emotional 
exhaustion which would generate an impediment to the resumption of a conflict. A second 
potential explanation for this finding is that increased intensity and fatalities will generate 
abhorrence toward civil conflict making the prospect of further warfare particularly 
unappealing.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Protracted conflicts will be less likely to recur than shorter conflicts. 
 Bearing in mind Collier et al’s claim (2004, p 253) that civil wars have an average 
duration of seven years compared with a mean duration of just 11 months for international 
wars (Bennett & Stam 1996), much consideration has been given to the duration of civil wars 
and why some conflicts last so much longer than others. Hence, it is also important to consider 
what impact civil war duration has on conflict recurrence.  
The duration of conflict was collected directly from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict 
Dataset and recorded to the nearest year. As with the previous two variables there was a 
substantial range in the duration of conflicts, from a low of one year through to the 44 year 
long separatist conflict in Burma involving the Karen ethnic group. As a result, the square root 
of conflict durations was taken so as to provide a more normal distribution. Using the square 
root transformed data, the mean duration of recurring conflicts is 1.70 years while in non-
recurring conflicts it is 1.55 years. There was no correlation to speak of between conflict 
duration and conflict recurrence [r= .066, n= 238, p= .309]. Hence, it would appear that 
hypothesis three is incorrect; based on this analysis conflict duration does not have any 
significant impact on conflict recurrence.  
This finding contradicts those of Hartzell (2001), Smith and Stam (2003), and Walter 
(2004) who have all found that conflicts with a longer duration are less likely to recur. The 
   
  
  
  
58 
most likely explanation for this digression is the different data which is used in each study. 
Walter’s findings were generated using the Correlates of War dataset which has a fatality 
threshold of 1,000 and 58 cases; this research uses the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset 
which has a fatality threshold of just 25 and 238 cases.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: A greater number of factions involved in a civil war will increase its 
susceptibility to recurrence.   
Sambanis and Doyle (2000, p 789) found a robust negative relationship between the 
number of factions and peace building success. Supporting this finding is a strong theoretical 
argument which suggests that greater numbers of factions will potentially generate a greater 
number of preferences. The greater the diversity of preferences, the less likely it is that all 
preferences can be accommodated in the post-conflict environment (Oye 1985). Put simply, the 
greater the number of competing factions, the greater the number of competing issues. As a 
result, at the conclusion of a conflict, there are increased chances of one party being 
dissatisfied with the outcome and once again resorting to armed conflict.  
The data regarding the number of factions was taken from the PRIO/CSCW dataset. 
The number of factions simply represents the number of opposition groups involved in the 
hostilities. The mean number of factions in conflicts which did recur was 1.34 compared with 
1.29 in non-recurring conflicts. There was very little correlation between the number of 
factions in a conflict and the likelihood of that conflict recurring [r= -.021, n= 238, p= .747]. 
Hence, while the direction of this relationship is concurrent with the findings of Sambanis and 
Doyle (2000) the strength of the relationship is not.  
There are several plausible explanations for this variation in results. The most obvious 
is that different datasets were used. Sambanis and Doyle have compiled their own dataset of 
civil wars which has the requirement of 1,000 deaths throughout the course of the conflict 
generating a dataset of 124 case compared to the considerably lower threshold used in this 
analysis (25 fatalities per year generating 238 cases). Another possible explanation which 
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should be considered is that the PRIO/CSCW dataset from which the information regarding the 
number of factions involved in each conflict was taken only includes the major factions which 
were involved in armed conflict. As a result there is very little variation in between the number 
of factions involved in different conflicts. It is likely that there are many smaller factions which 
were not included in this dataset along with interested factions which were not actually 
involved in the hostilities. The development of a more detailed dataset which included a more 
comprehensive list of civil war factions might well produce different results to those found in 
this research. It should also be remembered that Sambanis and Doyle (2000) were only 
considering the influence of the number of factions on peace building success, not civil war 
recurrence. It is possible that the factors which pose difficulties in the peace building process 
are different to those which increase susceptibility to civil war recurrence. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Conflicts which arise over territorial issues will be more likely to recur than 
those over competing claims for the control of government. 
 It is argued that for two reasons, conflicts arising over territorial issues will be more 
likely to recur. First, previous empirical research has found that conflicts arising over identity 
issues1 are much harder to resolve, hence the assumption is made that they will be more likely 
to recur  (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001; Lake & Rothchild 1996; Sambanis & Doyle 
2000). Secondly, when conflict emerges over issues pertaining to the control of the government, 
the victor in the conflict will inevitably gain control of the mechanisms of the state, hence 
increasing their power to deter future attacks. The data used to test this hypothesis was also 
taken directly from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset. Out of 238 conflicts, 106 
(44.5%) were territorial while 132 (55.5%) were fought for control of the government.  
                                                 
1 This research distinguishes between territorial conflicts and conflicts arising over competition for the control of 
government when describing the incompatibilities causing civil war. The assumption is made and explained in 
Chapter Two, that conflicts arising over territorial issues are more likely to be associated with identity issues than 
those arising over competition for the control of government. 
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It was found that conflicts over territorial issues were much more likely to recur than 
conflicts arising over competing claims for the control of government.  Disputed territorial 
issues were the root cause of 67.5% of conflicts which recurred while the remaining 32.5% of 
recurring conflicts were a result of competition to control government. When looking at 
conflicts which did not recur, the exact opposite proved to be the case. Competition for the 
control of government was the key incompatibility in 67.5% of these conflicts while territorial 
issues accounted for the remaining 32.5% of non-recurring conflicts. The results of Spearman’s 
Rank Order correlations showed a moderate positive correlation between territorial conflicts 
and conflict recurrence [r= .338, n= 238, p= .000*]. The inverse result applied to conflicts 
arising over competing claims for the control of government with a medium negative 
correlation between conflict recurrence and conflicts arising over control of government [r= -
.338, n= 238, p= .000*]. This result strongly supports the hypothesis that conflicts arising over 
territorial issues are more likely to recur than conflicts arising over competition for the control 
of government. It also supports the theoretical ideas that conflicts over identity issues will be 
more difficult to resolve and that the comparative advantage gained by victorious sides in 
conflicts over the control of government will make future conflict less likely.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 6: The likelihood of conflict recurrence increases with each additional episode 
of a civil war. 
 There are two competing theoretical ideas regarding this hypothesis, both of which 
share similarities with those regarding civil war duration. The first is that civil war 
economically and socially destabilises a country and creates resentment and feelings of 
bitterness which makes civil war recurrence more likely as the incidence of the conflict 
increases. The second is that civil war exhausts a country both physically and in terms of 
resources producing an abhorrence toward further conflict which makes the recurrence of civil 
war less likely with each episode of a conflict. It is hypothesised that the first of these two 
theoretical ideas is more accurate as many civil wars do not require significant resources and 
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most developing countries have an ample supply of young males meaning that exhaustion of 
man power and resources is unlikely to occur.  
 To test this hypothesis, the number of times each conflict recurred (using the definition 
discussed in the previous chapter) was recorded. There was a range in the number of 
recurrences from zero to five. Table 4.1 clearly shows that as the episode of a conflict increases 
the number of conflicts decreases. However, to determine whether the episode of a conflict has 
an impact on whether or not that conflict recurs, it is necessary to calculate what percentage of 
conflicts which recur one time, recur a subsequent time and what percentage of conflicts which 
recur for a second time recur a third time and so on. The results of these calculations are 
displayed in Table 4.2 and show that of all conflicts included in the dataset, 35% recurred at 
least once, and of those conflicts 41% recurred a second time. Given that there is not a large 
range in the number of conflict episodes it is difficult to establish a clear trend, however, it 
would appear that to a point, increased episode does increase the likelihood of subsequent 
recurrence. This trend is obviously only visible up to a certain point (the fourth episode) after 
which the likelihood of recurrence drops to 17% (after which there is no further recurrence).   
  
Table 4.1: Conflict Episode and Recurrence 
Episode of Recurrence  1 2 3 4 5 
Number of Occurrences  49 20 7 6 1 
 
Table 4.2: Conflict Episode and Likelihood of Recurrence 
Episode of Recurrence  1 2 3 4 5 
Number of Occurrences  35% 41% 35% 86% 17% 
  
When considering the two theoretical ideas regarding civil war episode, it would appear 
that to an extent, both are correct. Civil war inevitably does destabilise a country and will often 
generate deeply engrained resentment. As a result, conflicts are likely to recur on multiple 
occasions. This rule however is only valid to a certain extent, after several episodes of a 
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conflict, exhaustion and other problems associated with civil war begin to take their toll. 
Further conflict becomes an increasingly heinous prospect and likelihood of further recurrences 
begins to reduce. Hence, the likelihood of civil war recurrence relative to episode could be 
described as an ‘inverse U’ relationship. 
 
Geographic Characteristics: the Environment in which the Original Conflict 
Took Place 
 Along with the nature of the original conflict, geographic factors may also provide 
important clues as to why some civil wars are particularly susceptible to recurrence. While the 
importance of geography has long been recognised in the study of international conflict, 
research considering the influence of geographic factors in civil wars is relatively sparse. In 
one of the few studies which focuses on the geography of civil wars, Buhaug and Gates (2002) 
found that geographic factors had a significant impact on both the duration of civil wars and 
how civil wars end. However, this study did not consider geographic factors in relation to civil 
war recurrence. For this reason, a second group of antecedent variables will be analysed which 
includes the specific geographic characteristics of the battle zone along with the geographic 
characteristics of the relevant country as a whole. Five variables relating to the geographic 
characteristics of a conflict will be analysed; the location of the battle zone (both in relation to 
the nearest major population centre and the closest international border), the total land area of 
the country in which the conflict is fought, the radius of the battle zone, and the radius of the 
battle zone relative to the size of the country.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 7: Civil wars which are fought in close proximity to an international border 
are more likely to recur. 
Joes (1996, p 6) suggests that guerrilla armies are most successful when they can seek 
sanctuary and store vital supplies, particularly weaponry, in a neighbouring country. Based on 
   
  
  
  
63 
this logic, it is suggested that civil wars which are fought in close proximity to international 
borders are more likely to recur, as rebels can cross into neighbouring countries to rejuvenate 
and re-equip themselves before re-initiating hostilities at a later date. The location of each 
conflict is recorded in the PRIO/CSCW dataset; each conflict is assigned a centre point by its 
geographical coordinates (latitude and longitude). For each conflict, the distance between the 
conflict centre point and the closest part of an international border was measured using 
MapQuest’s online atlas (MapQuest 2006). The square root of this figure was again taken to 
ensure a normal distribution. This measurement makes the assumption that the closest part of 
an international border can actually be reached and permeated by guerrilla armies.   
Using square root transformed data, the mean distance from the nearest international 
border of a recurring conflict was 12.17 km compared with the marginally higher figure of 
13.28 km in conflicts which did not recur. There was a very weak negative correlation between 
the distance of civil conflicts to the nearest international border and conflict recurrence [r= -
.115, n= 238, p= .077]. Therefore while the initial hypothesis is not contradicted, the 
correlation is very weak indicating that the distance to the nearest international border alone is 
not an important variable in determining whether or not a conflict recurs.   
From an initial consideration, the findings concerning this variable might seem 
surprising given that both recurring and non-recurring conflicts have a centre-point over 200 
kms away from the nearest international border.1 However, the radii of battle zones were also 
measured (and are considered later in this chapter) and it was found that the mean radius of 
conflicts was 256.6 km and 263.9 km in recurring and non-recurring conflicts respectively. 
Hence, although the centre-point of conflicts is generally a significant distance from 
international borders, in most cases some of the fighting, particularly in the periphery of the 
battle zone, will be undertaken considerably closer to the border than the centre-point of the 
conflict would suggest.  
                                                 
1 Prior to taking the square root of this variable, the mean distance from the conflict epicentre to the nearest 
international border was 206.2km and 225.1km in recurring and non-recurring conflicts respectively.  
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HYPOTHESIS 8: Civil wars which are fought in isolated areas a considerable distance from 
major population centres will be more likely to recur. 
Fearon and Laitin (1999, p 4) have shown that conflicts are more likely to break out in 
rough terrain, particularly hills and mountains. As yet, however, they have not developed a 
concise coding for different terrain types. Rather than attempting to develop a coding for 
different terrain, it was decided to simply measure the distance between the conflict epicentre 
and the nearest major city. The assumption is made here that the types of terrain that are 
conducive to civil war will be more common in areas isolated from major population centres. It 
is suggested that conflicts in these isolated areas will experience similar problems to those 
close to an international border where, if overpowered, rebels can disperse and hide before 
regaining strength and re-initiating hostilities. The extent to which a conflict is isolated was 
measured by taking the PRIO/CSCW centre-point and measuring the distance from that point 
to the nearest city in the same country with a population of at least 500,000. In countries where 
there were no cities that large, the distance to the capital city was measured.  
Using square-root transformed data, a distinct difference was revealed between the 
location of recurring conflicts and non-recurring conflicts relative to the nearest major city. In 
conflicts which recurred, the mean distance from the conflict epicentre to the nearest major city 
was 21.90 km while in conflicts which did not recur the figure was much lower at just 13.68 
km. There was a moderate positive correlation between the distance of the conflict from the 
nearest major city and conflict recurrence [r= .356, n= 238, p= .000*]. Hence, the hypothesis 
that conflicts which are fought in more isolated areas are more likely to recur is supported.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 9: Conflicts are more likely to recur in countries which have a larger total land 
area.  
Based on similar logic to the previous hypothesis it is suggested that when conflicts 
take place in larger countries, in the face of strong state opposition, rebels will disperse over a 
wide area making their elimination more difficult. As a result, rebels will be more likely to 
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regroup at a later date and reinitiate hostilities. The land area of all states used to test this 
hypothesis was collected from the CIA World Factbook (CIA Factbook 2006)1. There was a 
huge variation in the size of countries which have experienced civil war, ranging from tiny 
countries such as Comoros which has a land area of just 2,170 km2 through to the USSR with a 
land area of 2,240,220 km2.  
Using square root transformed data, the mean land area of states in which conflicts 
recurred was 1146.5 km2 as opposed to 944.1 km2 in states where conflicts did not recur. 
Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation shows a moderate positive correlation between increased 
land area and conflict recurrence [r= .242, n= 238, p= .000*]. This correlation shows that when 
considered in isolation, the land area of the country in which a civil war takes place does have 
a noteworthy influence in determining whether or not that conflict recurs. This result is 
particularly interesting because the total land area of countries has not been considered an 
important variable in other studies which consider recurring civil war.   
   
HYPOTHESIS 10: Conflicts which have a smaller radius will be more likely to recur.  
 There are two plausible ideas regarding the radius of a conflict and how it might 
influence civil war recurrence. The first is that conflicts with a larger radius will involve 
fighting that is spread over a large area meaning that overcoming all facets of the opposition is 
more difficult. As a result, it is possible for those groups of rebels which have not been actively 
defeated to regroup and reinitiate hostilities at a later date. A second theory is that conflicts 
which take place over a larger land area are more likely to generate a high intensity, traditional 
style of warfare which is more likely to produce an outright victory and hence less likely to 
recur. This is compared with a small scale guerrilla type conflict which is unlikely to generate 
large scale warfare and hence prone to drag on for a number of years, often recurring at least 
once.  
                                                 
1 Except in the cases where the country’s territory had changed since the conflict (as is the case with some of the 
early conflicts in the USSR). In these cases the land area figures were gathered from a range of different sources.  
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 The data concerning the radii of conflicts was collected from the PRIO/CSCW Armed 
Conflict Dataset. The dataset defines conflict radius as “the largest geographic extent of the 
conflict zone from the centre point during the course of the conflict” (Strand et al. 2005, p 14). 
The radius is measured at 50km intervals, and makes the unrealistic assumption that a conflict 
is circular when in reality conflicts are more likely to follow natural contours such as 
mountains, rivers and international borders (Strand et al. 2005, p 14). 
Using square root transformed data there was very little difference between the mean 
radius of recurring and non-recurring conflicts. The mean radius of recurring conflicts was 
14.9km while in non-recurring conflicts it was 14.6km. Unsurprisingly there was only a very 
insignificant correlation between conflict recurrence and the radius of the conflict [r= .045, n= 
238, p= .486]. Hence, it seems clear that this variable does not play a significant role in 
determining whether or not a conflict recurs.  
    
HYPOTHESIS 11: Civil wars which have a smaller radius as a fraction of their land area will 
be more likely to recur.  
In light of the absence of any significant findings concerning the radius of the conflict, 
it was decided to put this variable in context by comparing the size of the conflict area with the 
size of the country in which the civil war is taking place. A seemingly small conflict in a large 
country such as China would have a totally different impact on a smaller state, such as Burundi. 
To do this, the radius of the conflict was divided by the total land area of the country in which 
the conflict took place. The result was multiplied by 100 and the square root of this figure was 
taken.  
The radius of conflicts which did recur as a percentage of the country’s total land area 
had a mean of 0.194%. The mean radius as a percentage of land area in civil wars which did 
not recur was significantly higher at 0.276%. There was a moderate negative correlation 
between the fraction of a state’s total land area in which the conflict actually took place and 
conflict recurrence [r= -.215, n= 238, p= .001*]. This shows that although there is little 
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difference between the total radius of recurring and non-recurring conflicts, conflicts which are 
more geographically concentrated relative to the size of the state in which they occur are more 
likely to recur. This finding supports the theoretical idea that small scale, guerrilla-style 
conflicts are more difficult for governments to overcome and as a result are more susceptible to 
recurrence.   
 
Ethno-Political Factors: Characteristics of the Country where the Conflict is 
Fought  
 Research into the factors which make countries susceptible to civil war tends to focus 
on the political environment in which the conflict broke out. The analysis of the following 
variables will consider similar variables and the impact that they have on civil war recurrence. 
Factors such as the demographic and ethnic composition of the country are predicted to 
influence the way in which conflicts are fought and the ease with which hostilities can be re-
ignited. The results from this analysis can be directly compared with research studying the 
outbreak of civil wars. Six ethno-political variables will be analysed: regime type, regime 
stability, total population, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, population density and the rural-
urban composition of the population. 
  
HYPOTHESIS 12: Civil wars which take place in a country with a mid-range regime type will 
be more likely to recur than those which are highly democratic or highly autocratic.  
HYPOTHESIS 13: Regime instability will increase countries’ susceptibility to conflict 
recurrence. 
 Much effort has been expended in considering the relationship between regime type 
and susceptibility to civil war. While there is still some controversy regarding this issue there is 
a relatively strong body of literature emerging which suggests that civil wars are more common 
in countries which have a ‘mid-range’ regime type (Hegre et al. 2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002; 
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Ellingsen, 2000). The term ‘mid-range’ is used here to describe regimes which are neither 
highly democratic nor highly autocratic. Given that countries with mid-range regimes are more 
susceptible to civil war it was decided to test whether countries with a history of such regimes 
are also more susceptible to civil war recurrence. 
 Data relating to regime type was collected from the fourth edition of the Polity dataset 
(Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2002). The Polity dataset was originally collected in 1975 under the 
direction of Robert Gurr and has been updated on many occasions subsequently, with the 
fourth edition released in 2004. During this time, the Polity datasets have become the most 
widely used source for monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority 
(Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2002, p 5). The two variables of particular interest in the Polity 
dataset are those which measure the levels of democracy and autocracy. The Polity dataset 
defines democracy as primarily conceived of three essential, interdependent elements. First, the 
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective 
preferences about policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalised constraints 
on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens 
in their daily lives and in acts of political participation (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2002, p 17). 
Based on these three elements, each state is assigned a score from 0-10. The Polity dataset 
defines an autocratic state as one which “restricts or suppresses competitive political 
participation (and whose) chief executives are chosen in a regularised process of selection 
within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional 
constraints” (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2002, p 18). Using three key indicators: the 
competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation and the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment; states are ranked between 0-10. From the autocracy 
and democracy scales each country is given an overall score between -10 (highly autocratic) 
and +10 (highly democratic) for each year since 1800.  
The goal when testing this variable was to establish whether the regime type influenced 
the likelihood of civil war recurrence. To do this, the mean Polity score in the five years 
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leading up to the original outbreak of conflicts was calculated in order to show the political 
environment in which the conflict broke out. The mean Polity score was also calculated for the 
five year period following the end of the civil war. Using this data the differences between pre- 
and post-conflict regime types were calculated. The results of this analysis are summarised in 
the Table 4.3 below. 
 
Table 4.3: Pre- and Post-Conflict Polity Scores and Regime Stability 
 
 Mean Pre-Conflict 
Polity Score 
Mean Post-Conflict 
Polity Score 
Change (Regime 
Stability) 
Recurring Conflicts -1.19 -0.53 0.66 
Non-Recurring Conflicts -2.97 -2.63 0.34 
 
When looking at the period prior to the outbreak of a civil war, the average Polity score 
in states which experienced recurring civil war was -1.19. In states where conflicts did not 
recur, the mean Polity score prior to the conflict emerging was -2.97. There is a very weak 
positive correlation between higher Polity scores and conflict recurrence [r= .113, n= 238, 
p= .083]. This result supports the hypothesis that states with a mid-range regime type are more 
prone to conflict recurrence than highly autocratic/democratic regimes; however, the trend 
established here is not strong enough to clearly support this idea.  
The mean Polity score in the five years following the initial conflict1 was also recorded 
in order to investigate the relationship between the post-conflict regime type and conflict 
recurrence. The mean post-conflict Polity score in the years following conflicts which 
eventually did recur was -0.53, while in conflicts which did not recur, the mean post-conflict 
Polity score was -2.63. There is a moderate positive correlation between a higher post-conflict 
Polity score and civil war recurrence which was significant at the 0.05 level [r= .156, n= 238, 
                                                 
1 When the conflict recurred in less than five years, the mean Polity score was recorded in the years of peace 
following the initial conflict.  
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p= .016*]. Conflicts which recurred had Polity scores both prior to and after the initial outbreak 
of the conflict that were closer to zero (the mid-point between a democratic and autocratic 
regime) than conflicts which did not recur. This finding supports the hypothesis that conflicts 
which take place in the context of a mid-range regime type are more likely to recur, however 
the finding was only statistically significant when considering the post-conflict Polity 
conditions.  
The analysis of regime stability (as measured by the change between pre- and post-
conflict Polity scores) also revealed some interesting results. The average Polity score in states 
which experienced recurring civil war increased by 0.66 from a pre-conflict mean of -1.19 to a 
post-conflict mean of 0.53. In states where conflicts did not recur, the mean Polity score 
increased by 0.34 from a pre-conflict mean of -2.97 to a post-conflict mean of -2.63. There is a 
very weak positive correlation between increased regime instability and civil war recurrence 
[r= .089, n= 238, p= .172]. Again, the direction of this relationship supports the hypothesis 
regarding civil war recurrence and regime instability, however, the trend established is not 
strong.  
The differences between pre- and post-conflict Polity scores were 0.66 and 0.34 in 
recurring and non-recurring conflicts respectively. The fact that in both recurring and non-
recurring conflicts the Polity conditions were marginally less autocratic in the period following 
the conflict than prior to the conflict could be interpreted as meaning that civil war helps 
countries to become more democratic. In reality however, this slight increase in political 
freedom is lower than the global rate at which countries have shifted away from highly 
autocratic governments during the time frame of this study1. Hence civil war is not a force 
which encourages democratic reform.    
 
                                                 
1 The mean duration of the civil wars examined in this research is 3.84 years, during this time the mean increase 
in polity scores for countries which experienced civil war was 0.46. The average increase in polity scores over the 
time period of this study for all countries (regardless of whether or not they experienced civil war) was 0.61 every 
3.84 years (Shackman 2006).  
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HYPOTHESIS 14: Ethnic diversity will not significantly influence civil war recurrence.  
There is a reasonable level of consensus among civil war scholars that ethnic diversity 
alone is not a variable which significantly contributes to the outbreak of civil war. Based on 
this theory it is suggested that conflicts fought in countries with high ethic diversity will not be 
more likely to recur than those in countries where there is low ethnic diversity. To test this 
hypothesis, data was collected from an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) 
(Annett 2001). The ELF Index used in this research was collated by Anthony Annett; ELF 
measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the country in question 
will not belong to the same ethnic group. It does not include any measure of the level of 
antagonism between ethnic groups. Countries are classified between 0.00 and 0.99 with higher 
values reflecting a greater degree of fractionalisation. For example, Norway has a very low 
level of ethnic fractionalisation with a score of 0.05 while India has one of the highest scores 
with 0.90. The figures which were used are an average taken from 1960 through to 1989; this 
time frame is generally consistent with the time frame that is used in this research. ELF scores 
ranged from 0.00 (South Korea) through to 0.93 (Uganda) (Annett 2001, p 573).  
The mean ELF score for states which experienced recurring civil war was 0.70, while 
in states which experienced civil war which did not recur the mean ELF score was 0.56. The 
Spearman Rank Order correlation showed a moderate positive correlation between higher ELF 
scores and civil war recurrence [r= .272, n= 205, p= .000*]. Hence, in isolation, there is a clear 
trend that conflicts which occur in countries with a greater level of ethnic diversity are more 
likely to recur. A likely explanation for this phenomenon is that although ethnicity does not 
play a major role in the initial outbreak of conflict, once a civil war has emerged it will often 
manifest along ethnic lines, and it is this added dimension to the conflict which makes 
recurrence more likely.   
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HYPOTHESIS 15: Higher population levels will increase susceptibility to civil war recurrence.  
 While testing the ‘greed versus grievance’ argument, Collier and Hoeffler (2001, p 13) 
found that the risk of civil conflict was roughly proportional to population size. The exact 
reason for this trend is not clear but Collier and Hoeffler suggest that both grievances and the 
opportunities for waging a rebellion increase with population. Based on these findings it was 
hypothesised that conflicts which take place in countries with larger populations would be 
more likely to recur than those which take place in countries with smaller populations.  
The data concerning population figures for the various countries which experienced 
civil war was collected from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
which lists the population for all states at five year intervals dating back to 1950 (United 
Nations 2006b). The population of each state which experienced civil war was recorded at the 
closest five year interval to the end of the conflict (the decision was made to record the 
population at the end of the conflict as in some cases population figures had changed 
significantly during the war, either from natural population growth or the fatalities incurred as 
a result of the conflict).   
The total population in states which experienced recurring civil war had a mean of 
337.04 while the mean population in states which experienced conflict which did not recur was 
162.23 (using square root transformed data). There was a moderate positive correlation 
between higher population and civil war recurrence [r= .341, n= 238, p= .000*]. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that countries with a higher population will be more likely to 
experience recurring civil war.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 16: Countries which have lower population density will be more likely to 
experience recurring civil war.  
HYPOTHESIS 17: High rural population figures will make civil war recurrence more likely.   
 Collier and Hoeffler (2001, p 5) have found that both population density and 
urbanisation tend to be lower in countries which experience civil war. Collier and Hoeffler 
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suggest that these factors inhibit government capability. It makes sense that a dispersed rural 
population would be more difficult to control than a concentrated city state. For this reason, it 
is suggested that when civil war breaks out in countries which exhibit these characteristics, 
conflict recurrence will be more likely.   
Data pertaining to these variables was also collected from the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (United Nations 2006b). The population density 
was recorded as the number of people per square kilometre (the square root of this figure was 
taken) and the distribution of the population was recorded as the percentage of the population 
which lived in a rural area.  
In countries where conflicts recurred, the mean population density was 8.61 people/km2 
while in countries where conflicts did not recur the mean population density was significantly 
lower at 6.61 people/km2 (using square root transformed data). The Spearman Rank Order 
Correlation showed a small positive correlation between population density and conflict 
recurrence [r= .215, n= 238, p= .000*]. This finding shows the opposite of what was predicted, 
with population density higher in states which experienced recurring civil war. It was expected 
that a more dispersed population would be more difficult for a government to control and 
hence increase a country’s susceptibility to subsequent conflict. Bearing this in mind it is 
difficult to explain the observed results, however, it is important to note that there is a very low 
population density in both recurring and non-recurring conflict cases given that the square root 
of the mean population density for all countries in the time period of this study is 29.3 
people/km2 (United Nations 2006b). 
There is very little difference between the rural/urban distributions of the population in 
countries which experienced recurring as opposed to non-recurring civil war. In both cases 
there is a relatively high rural population, comprising 67% and 65% of the population in 
recurring and non-recurring conflicts respectively. There is no correlation to speak of between 
the population distribution and conflict recurrence [r= .043, n= 238, p= .510]. Hence, this 
finding also contradicts the original hypothesis that countries with larger rural populations will 
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be more susceptible to conflict recurrence. However, it is again important to note that the 
fraction of the population living in a rural area in countries which experienced both recurring 
and non-recurring civil war is higher than the mean rural population figure in all countries for 
the period of this study which is 61%. Hence, while this variable does not provide any 
information regarding the causes of civil war recurrence, it does indicate that civil war 
occurrence in general is associated with larger rural populations.  
 
Third Party Characteristics: the Intervention of Third Parties during the Course 
of the Initial Conflict 
 The final set of variables considered at the antecedent level of analysis is the 
involvement of a third party during the course of the conflict. The involvement of another state 
is likely to have a significant influence on the complexion of a conflict. Given that a major 
component of this research is to determine how the nature of a conflict influences the 
likelihood of its recurrence, an intervention by a third party is an important issue to consider. 
Most research which considers the nature of third party interventions tends to focus on the 
involvement of mediators and negotiators in the post-conflict environment (Bercovitch, 2003; 
Regan and Rodwan, 2002; Rauchhaus, 2006). To my knowledge this is the first study which 
considers the effect of third party involvement (during hostilities) on civil war recurrence.  
  
HYPOTHESIS 18: The intervention of a third party during a conflict will reduce the 
probability conflict recurrence.  
HYPOTHESIS 19: The extent to which a third party will reduce the likelihood of a conflict 
recurring is dependent on their power. 
It is hypothesised that the presence of a third party involved in the actual hostilities of a 
civil war will have a similar effect to what Walter (1997) describes as a security guarantee. By 
supporting one side in a conflict, a third party is displaying a strong interest in the conflict 
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being resolved in a particular way, hence sending a message to the opposition that they are 
willing to invest heavily to ensure a certain outcome is achieved. If a third party successfully 
intervenes in a civil war it is likely that they will want to protect their investment and ensure 
that the status quo that they have established remains, in doing this the third party will deter 
future aggression from the opposition. However, a third party’s ability to generate this effect 
will be dependent on having a sufficient level of power so as to produce a credible level of 
deterrence. Data concerning the involvement of third parties in conflicts was taken from the 
PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). 
When looking at conflicts which recurred, five (6%) involved a third party. Of the 
conflicts which did not recur, 18 (11.6%) involved a third party. There was only a very weak 
negative correlation between third party involvement and civil war recurrence [r= .090, n= 238, 
p= .166]. Hence the hypothesis that the involvement of a third party will reduce the likelihood 
of civil war recurrence is not supported. Due in a large part to the small proportion of conflicts 
which involved a third party, there is no discernable trend in the relationship between the 
power of the third party involved in the conflict and whether or not the conflict recurs (see 
Appendix C).  
In the five civil wars which involved external intervention and recurred, the third party 
sided with the opposition on one occasion, with the government on two occasions and in the 
remaining two cases there was third party involvement on both sides. In the 18 civil wars 
which involved external intervention and did not recur, two cases involved third party 
involvement on both the government and opposition side. Of the remaining 16 cases, the third 
party was involved eight times on either side. This shows that there is no tendency for third 
parties to take a particular side when intervening in civil wars. 
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Current Conditions: Conflict Cessation and the Nature of the Post-Conflict 
Environment 
 The previous factors which were examined involved variables at the antecedent level of 
analysis. The framework of analysis used in this research argues that civil war recurrence is 
contingent on both antecedent and current factors. Current conditions include the post-conflict 
environment along with the manner in which the civil war ended. Walter (2004) has considered 
the post-conflict environment in detail and found that a low post-conflict quality of life and 
barriers to political participation were correlated with civil war recurrence. Given that Walter 
(2004) has already considered the nature of post-conflict living conditions, this research will 
not consider quality of life variables. Three variables will be considered at the current level of 
analysis: the nature of any military victory, the means by which a civil war ends, and the nature 
of any United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. The relationship between post-conflict 
political systems and civil war recurrence has already been considered, with evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that “mid-range” post-conflict regime types will be most susceptible 
to civil war recurrence.    
 
HYPOTHESIS 20: Conflicts which end as a result of a decisive military victory will be less 
likely to recur.  
HYPOTHESIS 21: The means by which a conflict ends will influence the likelihood of civil 
war recurrence. 
 Hypotheses 20 and 21 were tested to determine how the way in which a conflict ends 
influences the likelihood of conflict recurrence. Walter (2004) has found that conflicts which 
end in a decisive victory are less likely to recur as a result of the victorious party gaining full 
control of the state allowing them to consolidate their power and deter future challenges. It is 
expected that the findings of this research will match those of Walter’s with conflicts that end 
in a decisive military victory being considerably less likely to recur. However, in the dataset 
used in this research, only 43% of conflicts ended by way of a military victory meaning that it 
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was also necessary to investigate the relationship between conflict recurrence and other forms 
of conflict cessation.  
Information regarding how conflicts ended was collected from the PRIO/CSCW 
Conflict Termination Dataset (forthcoming). This project grouped conflict terminations into six 
different categories. First, peace agreements, which are defined as an agreement which 
regulates or solves the central part of a conflict which is signed or accepted by all the major 
parties involved in the conflict. Secondly, ceasefires with conflict regulation which are signed 
or accepted by all the major parties involved in the conflict. The third means of cessation is a 
ceasefire which includes an agreement amongst the major parities involved in the conflict to 
stop military action but does not include conflict regulation. A fourth conflict outcome is 
military victory where one side active in the last year of conflict is either defeated or succumbs 
to the power of the other through capitulation or public announcement. The fifth potential 
outcome occurs as a result of either low or no activity where the level of intensity or 
organisation does not meet the criteria set out in the definition of a civil conflict. A final 
category of conflict termination is also includes any other theoretically possible conflict 
outcome.  
Of 83 conflicts which recurred, just seven (8.4%) ended as a result of a military victory. 
Of the seven conflicts which ended in military victory, the government was victorious on all 
but one occasion. Contrastingly, of 155 civil conflicts which did not recur, 96 (61.9%) ended 
by way of military victory. Of these victories 66 (68.75%) were won by the government of the 
state in question. A strong negative correlation was found between the presence of a military 
victory and conflict recurrence [r= -.515, n= 238, p= .000**]. This result supports Walter’s 
(2004) findings and the hypothesis that conflicts which end as a result of military victory are 
less likely to recur.  
Having established that the presence or absence of a military victory is clearly an 
influential factor in determining conflict recurrence, the next step is to consider other ways in 
which conflicts were terminated. The following Tables (4.4 and 4.5) show a clear tendency for 
   
  
  
  
78 
conflicts which recur to end as a result of low activity or stalemate, while conflicts which do 
not recur tend to end as a result of one side achieving military victory.  
 
 
Table 4.4: Nature of Cessation in Recurring Conflicts 
Means of Resolution Number of Cases % of Total 
Peace Agreement 6 7.2 
Ceasefire with Conflict Regulation 6 7.2 
Ceasefire 3 3.6 
Victory  7 8.4 
Low/No Activity 57 68.8 
Other  4 4.8 
 
 
Table 4.5: Nature of Cessation in Non-Recurring Conflicts 
Means of Resolution Number of Cases % of Total 
Peace Agreement 22 14.2 
Ceasefire with Conflict Regulation 3 1.9 
Ceasefire 2 1.3 
Victory  96 61.9 
Low/No Activity 30 19.4 
Other  2 1.3 
 
 
Table 4.6 shows the full results of Spearman’s Rank Order Correlations for all possible 
modes of conflict cessation including military victory. Two strong correlations were revealed, 
both of which were significant at the 0.01 level. Conflicts which ended as a result of low or no 
activity were positively correlated with civil war recurrence while conflicts which ended by 
way of a military victory were negatively correlated with conflict recurrence. A weaker 
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positive correlation, significant at the 0.05 level, was found between ‘ceasefires with conflict 
regulation’ and conflict recurrence. Surprisingly, the same correlation was not present between 
‘ceasefires without conflict regulation’ and civil war recurrence.    
 
 
 
Table 4.6: Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation, Type of Cessation and Conflict 
Recurrence 
 
 Peace 
Agreement 
Ceasefire + 
Conflict  
Regulation 
Ceasefire – 
Conflict 
Regulation 
Victory Low/No 
Activity 
Other 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.103 .132* .077 -.515** .488** .107 
Sig. (2-tailed) .113 .041 .235 .000 .000 .099 
N 238 238 238 238 238 238 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS 22: UN peacekeeping will reduce the likelihood of civil war recurrence. 
UN peacekeeping missions have experienced varying levels of success, however the 
weight of available literature suggests that their overall influence is a positive one. Data 
concerning the involvement of UN peacekeeping forces in civil wars was recorded from the 
UN web page and was measured according to the duration of the mission in months (United 
Nations 2006a). Only two cases of UN peacekeeping took place in conflicts which recurred, 
generating an average of 1.5 months of peacekeeping. There were 15 cases of UN 
peacekeeping in conflicts which did not recur, generating a mean of 5 months. This indicates 
that the presence of UN peacekeeping does reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence, 
however, Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation revealed only a very weak negative correlation 
between the duration of UN peacekeeping missions and conflict recurrence [r= -.063, n= 238, 
p= .334]. Although this result produces only a very weak correlation, it does indicate that UN 
peacekeeping has a positive impact on post-conflict peace building. It is important to 
remember that at this stage, only 17 UN peacekeeping operations have taken place in response 
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to civil wars. As the number of UN missions increases, hopefully the trend established in this 
research will become more pronounced.   
 
Summary 
 Based on the previous analysis, major changes can be made to the Contingency Model 
of Conflict Recurrence. Figure 4.2 shows the variables which had a significant influence on 
civil war recurrence when tested in the previous analysis.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Revised Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence (Based on Bi-Variant 
Analysis) 
 
     Antecedent Conditions             Current Conditions               Consequent Conditions 
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Factors Relating to the Original Conflict 
One variable in this category was found to have a statistically significant impact on the 
likelihood of civil war recurrence: the incompatibility causing the conflict. Conflicts which 
recurred tended to arise over territorial issues while those which did not recur tended to arise as 
a result of challenges for the control of government.  
 
Geography of the Conflict 
The total land area of countries which experienced recurring civil war was higher than 
in countries which experienced non-recurring civil war. While the mean radius of conflicts was 
similar for both recurring and non-recurring conflicts, the radius as a percentage of the total 
land area did reveal a significant result. Conflicts which recurred were generally fought over a 
smaller portion of the state’s territory than conflicts which did not recur. The other significant 
geographical factor was the proximity of the conflict to the nearest major city or the state’s 
capital city. Conflicts which recur tend to be fought further away from major cities while those 
which do not recur were generally fought closer to major cities.  
 
Ethno-Political Factors 
Several significant correlations were found when considering factors specific to the 
state in which the civil war took place. Conflicts which took place in states where there was a 
higher level of ethnic diversity (as measured by the scale of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation) 
were more likely to recur. The total population in countries which experienced recurring civil 
conflict was considerably higher than countries which experienced isolated conflicts. 
Surprisingly, countries which experienced recurring civil war were also more likely to have a 
higher population density than countries which experienced isolated conflict.  
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Third Party Involvement  
No statistically significant results were found pertaining to the involvement of a third 
party during the conflict.  
 
Current Conditions 
The most important current factor influencing civil war recurrence is the means by 
which the conflict ends. The majority of conflicts which recurred ended as a result of low or no 
activity while conflicts which did not recur generally ended by way of a military victory. 
Conflicts which ended by way of a ceasefire with conflict regulation were also correlated with 
conflict recurrence. The nature of the post-conflict regime was also significant with mid-range 
regimes (neither highly democratic or highly autocratic) significantly more likely to experience 
recurring civil war.   
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Chapter Five 
 
Multi-Variant Analysis and Discussion 
 
 
Introduction 
The initial findings discussed in the previous chapter only represent those based on 
descriptive information and bi-variant analysis. Bi-variant analysis assumes that the only factor 
influencing the dependent variable is the one independent variable which is being tested. 
Hence it is necessary to undertake more advanced analysis to gain a more accurate picture of 
the variables which contribute to the problem of civil war recurrence. As it has been mentioned, 
it is beyond the scope of this research to consider every conceivable factor which might 
influence civil war recurrence. Instead, the same variables which were analysed individually in 
the previous chapter will be grouped together and tested in clusters so as to achieve a more 
realistic idea of which factors are most strongly associated with civil war recurrence. Variables 
were grouped according to the categories shown in the Contingency Model of Conflict 
Recurrence then tested using Binary Logistic Regressions. The most significant results from 
each cluster (t = >0.05) were then tested again as a separate set of variables to give the closest 
possible indication of which variables influence conflict recurrence.    
 
Multi-Variant Analysis  
Conflict Characteristics 
 When the variables in this category were considered individually, the only significant 
finding was that conflicts which arose over territorial issues were more likely to recur while 
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those arising over competing claims for the control of government were less likely to recur. 
When the variables pertaining to the nature of the original conflict were considered together, 
the incompatibility causing the conflict remained the only significant result. Conflicts arising 
over territorial issues were positively associated with conflict recurrence while conflicts arising 
over competing claims for governmental control were negatively correlated with conflict 
recurrence. The model complied with goodness of fit tests (Omnibus Tests of Model 
Coefficients and Hosmer Lemeshow Test). The variables in this analysis were responsible for 
between 14.2% and 19.5% of the variance in the independent variable (Cox & Snell R Square 
= 0.142, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.195).  
 
 
Table 5.1: Logistic Regression: Conflict Characteristics 
 
Variable B S.E. Wald Df Significance Exp(B) 
Territory** 1.550 .302 26.369 1 .000 4.712 
Government** -1.550 .302 26.369 1 .000 .212 
Duration -.002 .028 .007 1 .932 .998 
Number of Factions .235 .177 1.760 1 .185 1.265 
Total Fatalities .001 .004 .079 1 .779 1.001 
Intensity -.012 .008 2.511 1 .113 .988 
*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01. 
 
Geographic Characteristics 
When tested individually, three variables had a significant influence on civil war 
recurrence: total land area, the radius of the conflict relative to the size of the country and the 
proximity of the conflict to the nearest major city. When tested together, two significant results 
were revealed from this group of variables. First, a positive relationship, significant at the 0.01 
level, was revealed between conflict recurrence and the distance from the centre of the conflict 
to the nearest major city. As the distance from the nearest major city increases, the likelihood 
of civil war recurrence increases. Secondly, the radius of the conflict relative to the land area of 
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the country was significant at the 0.05 level. This correlation was negative indicating that as 
the area of the conflict relative to the total land area of the country increases, the likelihood of 
civil war recurrence decreases. The model complied with goodness of fit tests (Omnibus Tests 
of Model Coefficients and Hosmer Lemeshow Test). The variables in this analysis were 
responsible for between 13.5% and 18.6% of the variance in the independent variable (Cox & 
Snell R Square = 0.135, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.186). 
 
 
Table 5.2: Logistic Regression: Geographic Characteristics 
 
Variable 
B S.E. Wald Df Significance Exp(B) 
Total Land Area .000 .000 1.060 1 .303 1.000 
Radius % Land* -2.893 1.330 4.734 1 .030 .055 
Conflict Radius -.002 .027 .006 1 .939 .998 
Distance to Border -.033 .023 2.108 1 .147 .967 
Distance to Major City** .056 .014 16.493 1 .000 1.058 
*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01. 
 
 
Ethno-Political Characteristics 
Using Binary Logistic Regression to analyse ethno-political factors showed that high 
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) scores are positively correlated with civil war 
recurrence and significant at the 0.01 level. A positive correlation between population density 
and conflict recurrence was also revealed and significant to the 0.05 level. While not 
significant below 0.05, this model also shows a noteworthy correlation between increased total 
population and conflict recurrence. The model (see table 5.3) complied with goodness of fit 
tests (Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients and Hosmer Lemeshow Test). The variables in this 
analysis were responsible for between 15.7% and 21.5% of the variance in the independent 
variable (Cox & Snell R Square = 0.157, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.215). 
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Table 5.3: Logistic Regression: Ethno-Political Characteristics 
 
Variables B S.E. Wald Df Significance Exp(B) 
% Population Rural -.011 .008 1.763 1 .184 .989 
ELF Index** 2.246 .829 7.343 1 .007 9.451 
Total Population .001 .001 2.977 1 .084 1.001 
Population Density* .100 .049 4.233 1 .040 1.105 
Pre-Conflict Polity Score -.015 .032 .226 1 .634 .985 
Post-Conflict Polity Score -.017 .036 .219 1 .640 .983 
Polity Change -.016 .030 .263 1 .608 .985 
*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01. 
 
Current Conditions 
The ‘current conditions’ variables had the greatest explanatory power in elucidating the 
reasons for civil war recurrence accounting for between 31.5% and 43.4% of variation (Cox & 
Snell R Square = 0.315, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.434). Three relationships were found which 
were significant below the 0.01 level (see table 5.4). Conflicts which ended with a peace 
agreement and those which ended as a result of military victory were negatively correlated 
with conflict recurrence, while conflicts which ended as a result of low or no activity were 
significantly more likely to recur.  
 
 
Table 5.4: Logistic Regression: Current Conditions 
 
Variables B S.E. Wald df Significance Exp(B) 
UN Peacekeeping (months) -.003 .006 .266 1 .606 .997 
Peace Agreement** -1.910 .516 13.709 1 .000 .148 
Ceasefire with CR .040 .743 .003 1 .957 1.041 
Ceasefire without CR -.260 .942 .076 1 .782 .771 
Victory** -3.279 .454 52.246 1 .000 .038 
Low/No Activity** 1.910 .516 13.709 1 .000 6.755 
Other .110 .904 .015 1 .903 1.116 
*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01. 
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Analysis Considering Significant Variables 
Based on the preceding multi-variant analysis nine factors were found to have some 
significance (t = >0.05). These variables were then grouped together and analysed using Binary 
Logistic Regression.  
 
 
Table 5.5: Logistic Regression: Significant Variables 
   
Variables B S.E. Wald df Significance Exp(B) 
Government -.759 .451 2.834 1 .092 .468 
Territory .759 .451 2.834 1 .092 .468 
Radius % Land Area .024 1.537 .000 1 .987 1.024 
Distance to Major City .000 .000 .376 1 .540 1.000 
ELF* 2.012 .972 4.286 1 .038 7.481 
Population Density .002 .002 .815 1 .367 1.002 
Low/No Activity -.036 .639 .003 1 .955 .964 
Military Victory** 2.660 .716 13.801 1 .000 14.292 
Peace Agreement 1.430 .781 3.351 1 .067 4.180 
*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01. 
 
 
As shown in table 5.5, two variables were found to be statistically significant in 
determining whether or not a conflict will recur. The presence of a military victory was found 
to be highly significant (t=.000) while the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation was 
significant below the 0.05 level (t=.038). The incompatibility causing the conflict was also of 
noteworthy significance (t=>0.1), with conflicts arising over territorial issues more likely to 
recur while conflicts arising over competition for the control of government were less likely to 
recur.  
Interestingly, the results of this model changed significantly when the peace agreement 
variable was excluded from the analysis. The most noteworthy difference was that a significant 
positive correlation emerges between conflicts which ended as a result of low or no activity 
and conflict recurrence. 
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Table 5.6: Logistic Regression: Significant Variables (Peace Agreement Excluded) 
  
Variables B S.E. Wald df Significance Exp(B) 
Government* -.918 .441 4.339 1 .037 .399 
Territory* .918 .441 4.339 1 .037 .399 
Radius % Land Area -.314 1.646 .036 1 .849 .730 
Distance to Major City .000 .000 1.087 1 .297 1.000 
ELF* 1.945 .951 4.179 1 .041 6.994 
Population Density .002 .002 1.422 1 .233 1.002 
Low/No Activity* .867 .442 3.855 1 .050 2.380 
Military Victory** -1.827 .544 11.287 1 .001 .161 
*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01. 
 
 From this revised model, five significant relationships are revealed. High ELF, 
territorial conflicts and conflicts which end as a result of low or no activity all have a positive 
relationship with civil war recurrence and were significant at the 0.05 level. Conflicts ending as 
a result of military victory and those arising over the issue of governmental control were both 
negatively associated with civil war recurrence at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively. These 
variables are shown in a revised version of the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence 
(Figure 5.1) which illustrates the conditions under which a conflict is most likely to recur.  
 
Figure 5.1: Revised Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence  
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Discussion 
 
The remainder of this chapter will summarise the results and ramifications of both the 
single variable and multi-variant analysis. The results are divided between those which were of 
very little or no significance, those which exhibited some relevance, and those which were 
statistically significant.  The four variables which were found to have a statistically significant 
influence on civil war recurrence are discussed in greater detail considering two important 
issues. First, potential explanations for the observed correlation are discussed. Secondly, the 
findings are discussed with reference to the improvement of civil war management and the 
goal of preventing civil war recurrence. The findings from this discussion will be summarised 
in the final chapter where a number of policy recommendations will be introduced which 
pertain to civil war management and the prevention of civil war recurrence.     
 
Insignificant Results 
 Before considering the ramifications of the significant findings, it is important to 
consider the variables which did not significantly influence the likelihood of civil war 
recurrence. Seven variables failed to have a noteworthy influence on civil war recurrence at 
any stage of the analysis: the number of factions involved in the conflict, the radius of the 
conflict, the proximity of the conflict to the nearest international border, the country’s pre-
conflict regime type, regime stability, the involvement of a third party in the conflict and the 
proportion of the population living in a rural environment.  
While these variables did not significantly influence whether or not a conflict recurred, 
they did reveal and reinforce some relevant ideas regarding civil wars in general. Discussion 
considering why these variables did not have the predicted influence on civil war recurrence is 
contained in the previous chapter. 
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Intermediary Results 
 There are a number of variables which were not significant when tested using multi-
variant analysis but were significant when tested independently. These variables are classified 
as “intermediary” as, although they were not statistically significant, they also cannot be 
definitively discounted as variables which might help to predict civil war recurrence. This 
category includes the duration of the conflict, total fatalities, conflict intensity, conflict episode, 
total population, population density, UN involvement, post-conflict regime type, distance of 
the conflict to the nearest major city, and the radius of the conflict relative to the size of the 
country.    
 
Significant Results 
 Four variables were found to be significantly correlated with civil war recurrence when 
tested individually as well as when tested using multi-variant analysis. Most noteworthy were 
the means by which conflicts ended.  Conflicts which ended as a result of a decisive military 
victory showed a strong negative correlation with civil war recurrence (significant at the 0.01 
level). This finding concurs with that of Walter’s (2004) and the notion that the victorious 
party in a conflict will be able to take control of the mechanisms of government and 
consolidate their power and hence deter future challenges.  
Conflicts which ended as a result of low or no activity were positively correlated with 
civil war recurrence. Where one party invests in a conflict, yet fails to establish a decisive 
domination over the other, it is logical that a re-initiation of hostilities is likely. The source of 
the conflict was also a statistically significant variable. Conflicts arising over territorial issues 
were positively correlated with civil war recurrence while conflicts arising over competition 
for the control of government were negatively correlated with recurrence. High ELF scores 
were also positively correlated with civil war recurrence, meaning that civil wars which take 
place in countries with greater ethnic diversity are more susceptible to recurrence.  
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Finding 1: Civil Wars which End by way of a Decisive Military Victory are less 
likely to Recur 
 
“If there’s a problem we solve it we don’t resolve it, it usually just evolves into one big brawl 
and we all get involved in it” (Eminem, 2006). 
 
 Multi-variant analysis clearly shows that conflicts which end as a result of a military 
victory are less likely to recur. It is logical that where one party has achieved sufficient 
advantage over their opponents to defeat them militarily the defeated party will lack the 
strength and motivation necessary to re-group and re-initiate hostilities within a ten year period. 
In addition, the victorious party in a conflict will often gain control of the country in question, 
enabling them to further consolidate their advantage over the opposition and deter future attack 
(Walter 2004, p 374). While theoretically logical, this finding is problematic as it implies that a 
good way to ensure that a conflict does not recur is for one party to simply annihilate its 
enemies. Are attempts to resolve civil conflicts peacefully simply an ineffectual waste of time? 
Would the international community be better served heeding the advice of rapper Eminem and 
solve conflicts by way of brute force rather than attempting to resolve them peacefully and 
running the risk of conflict escalation and prolongation?  
At first glance, such a proposition seems outrageous. However, given the severity of 
some civil wars it could be argued that the international community should throw its support 
behind one party in a civil war, ensuring that the conflict comes to a rapid conclusion and that 
order is re-established in that country. This process has been used to deal with international 
conflict and achieved a measure of success in dealing with Iraq’s invasion and annexation of 
Kuwait in 1990. In this case, a large international force led by the United States and backed by 
the United Nations combined to effectively and efficiently expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait 
(Kahn, 1990). Could a similar process work in civil wars with external forces assisting one side 
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in the conflict and helping to bring that conflict to a rapid conclusion? While this process 
would involve considerable bloodshed before the conflict ended, at least it could be trusted to 
bring a more rapid and permanent end to the conflict.  
Such a process would, however, generate far more problems than it would solve. The 
obvious problem being that the adoption of this method of conflict management would take 
place at the expense of more peaceful, albeit potentially less reliable, conflict management 
strategies. A second problem is that there would be massive difficulty in deciding which party 
to support in a civil conflict. In the international example of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the 
decision of the international community to oppose Iraq was a relatively straightforward one. It 
was the first case of one UN member state terminating the sovereignty of another UN member 
by force, meaning that Iraq had undeniably breached international law (Kahn 1993, p 427). 
Contrastingly, in most civil wars, wrong and right are generally much more difficult to 
distinguish. For example, when considering civil wars in Myanmar; would the international 
community support an ethnic group fighting for territorial independence or a highly autocratic 
military dictatorship? Furthermore, this approach to conflict management has the potential for 
Cold War-style confrontations to emerge where various countries support one party in a 
conflict while other countries lend support to opposing factions. Such a situation would most 
likely increase the intensity of a conflict rather than leading to a rapid conclusion. A final 
problem with the use of third parties to forcefully resolve conflicts is that superior military 
strength does not necessarily equate to a rapid military victory as was the case in the expulsion 
of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The Vietnam Civil War and the Afghan Civil War are both 
conflicts where a major power, USA and the Soviet Union respectively, has intervened and 
added considerable strength to one side in a conflict. In spite of the interventions by major 
powers, both civil wars could not be brought to a rapid or comprehensive conclusion; in reality 
both escalated.  
   
  
  
  
93 
Along with the obvious ethical issues associated with pursuing a violent means of 
conflict resolution, there are also practical issues which make it a potentially disastrous option 
for conflict management. Therefore, it is clear that the option of encouraging sides to fight to 
the death is a poor one. However, the findings from this research indicate that when a conflict 
does not end as a result of a military victory, the conflict is likely to re-emerge at a later date. 
Hence the international community is faced with a concerning dilemma; the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts and civil war non-recurrence appear to be mutually exclusive goals.  
In order to alleviate this paradox, greater investment is required in peace building and 
negotiation efforts. Increased investment in peace building will improve its success rate and 
increase the likelihood of genuine conflict resolution, rather than peace building being a mere 
hiatus between conflict episodes. At this stage peace building efforts have only had a moderate 
level of success. The parties engaged in civil war will enter formal negotiations in 
approximately 50% of all civil wars, however less than 20% of civil conflicts are ended by way 
of a successful negotiated settlement (Wood 2003, p 247-248). Of the conflicts included in this 
analysis, 7.2% of the conflicts which recurred ended by way of a negotiated settlement. Hence, 
peace agreements are relatively uncommon in civil war and not necessarily a stable form of 
resolution.  
Existing research considering why peace agreements are so difficult to implement has 
revealed several factors which need to be addressed in order to improve future peace building 
efforts. One of the key difficulties in resolving civil wars is that in accepting a peace agreement, 
competing factions must relinquish important fall-back defences at a time when there is no 
established legitimate government or neutral police to enforce the peace (Walter 1997, p 337). 
It is this vulnerability which makes the seemingly horrific prospect of continued fighting more 
appealing than attempting to negotiate a settlement. The most successful response to this 
problem is the provision of a “security guarantee” by a third party. In an empirical analysis of 
the factors which affect the durability of civil war settlements, Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 
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(2001) have found that settlements are much more successful when they include provisions for 
third party enforcement. Third party enforcement provides a guarantee that a third party will 
intervene to ensure the safety of the combatants should such a move be necessary. This reduces 
the vulnerability of the combatants in the post-conflict environment making co-operation and 
relinquishment of arms considerably easier.  
Along with the importance of third party guarantors, researchers considering the 
success of negotiated settlements have also illustrated the importance of including provisions 
for power sharing in any negotiated civil war settlements (de Soto & del Costillo, 1995; 
Licklider, 1995; Hampson, 1996; Stedman & Rothchild, 1996). The implementation of 
multifaceted power sharing institutions will ensure that the former combatants all have a vested 
interest in maintaining peace meaning that the peace agreement becomes “self-enforcing” 
(Hoddie & Hartzell 2003, p 304).   
While the benefits of power sharing institutions and third party guarantors are relatively 
clear, the quantity of academic research considering the success and failure of negotiated peace 
settlements remains relatively sparse. It is important for this body of literature to be expanded 
so that policy makers can draft clearer guidelines as to the determinant factors in the success of 
negotiated settlements. Until the success rate of negotiated settlements can be improved, policy 
makers will have a difficult task in convincing combatants to lay down their weapons and enter 
negotiations.  
In spite of the difficulties associated with maintaining lasting civil war settlements, 
third party guarantors, power sharing provisions, and continued research will ensure that 
negotiated settlements become a better option, not only for policy makers but also for the 
combatants themselves.   
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Finding 2: Conflicts which End as a Result of Low or No Activity are more   
likely to Recur 
While conflicts which ended as a result of a military victory were less likely to recur, 
the opposite proved to be the case when considering conflicts which ended by way of low or no 
activity; these conflicts were strongly correlated with civil war recurrence. It would appear that 
when conflicts reach a stage where there is minimal or no activity, on too many occasions the 
conflict is left to simmer and in many cases will restart at a later date. Of 87 conflicts which 
ended as a result of low or no activity, just 30 (34%) remained inactive for at least ten years 
with the remaining 57 (66%) recurring.  
 When a conflict reaches a stage where there is low or no activity it would appear to be 
the ideal time for a peace process to begin. Why is it then, that when there is a break in 
hostilities such a small percentage of warring countries are able to make more significant 
progress toward genuine resolution? Is it a case of third parties being unable to bring the 
conflicting sides together even during a lull in the hostilities, or is it assumed that once a 
conflict has dropped in intensity it is no longer a priority and hence interested third parties are 
better off concentrating their resources in other areas?  
First, it is important to note that conflicts which end as a result of low or no activity 
tend to have a lower intensity than other conflicts; conflicts which ended in low or no activity 
had a mean intensity of 27.8 while all other conflicts had a notably higher mean intensity of 
44.8 (using square root data). Hence, it is plausible that interested third parties might make the 
assumption that these conflicts are a low priority that have wound down to a natural conclusion 
and hence are not in need of intensive conflict management. However, the sheer number of 
conflicts which end as a result of no or low activity and subsequently recur proves that this is 
clearly not the case.  
Rather than leaving these conflicts to stagnate (and in most cases eventually re-ignite), 
surely a better approach would be to take advantage of the lull in hostilities and try to build a 
more co-operative relationship between the competing factions. As mentioned earlier, an initial 
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consideration would suggest that conflicts with low or no hostilities would be ideally suited to 
the initiation of some form of peace building process. Peace building efforts would not be 
hampered by direct fighting and the lack of trust generated by the conflict would be less severe 
at this time. In a sense, half the battle has already been won, the cause of the conflict might not 
have been resolved but at least the factions are no longer engaged in open combat.  
The discussion regarding the previous finding (pages 91 – 94), argued that while peace 
agreements are not necessarily the most stable form of conflict resolution, they remain the most 
promising alternative to ongoing civil war. This argument is supported by Sambanis and Doyle 
(2000, p 785) who found that where some form of agreement or treaty was signed, peace 
building was more likely to succeed, not necessarily because the combatants were bound by the 
agreement, but because such an action showed that both parties had some motivation to move 
toward resolution. While not as conclusive as other findings, this research also indicated that 
conflicts which ended in a peace agreement are less likely to recur. 28 conflicts in the dataset 
ended with a peace agreement with just six (21%) of these conflicts recurring while the other 
22 (79%) remained inactive. Bearing this in mind, surely a period of low or no activity should 
not be seen by interested parties as the end of a conflict but rather as an opportunity to begin a 
peace building process and to ensure that the cessation in hostilities remains permanent.  
Interestingly, this is not necessarily the case. It has been argued that the ideal time to 
initiate peace talks is when the parties involved in a conflict are struggling to achieve 
dominance over their opposition. Zartman (1989), Hass (1990) and Steadman (1991) have all 
focused on the notion of “ripeness”. Rather than isolating a specific stage in the conflict, they 
argue that successful conflict mediation is dependent on the identification of a ripe moment in 
the course of a conflict. Zartman (1989) argues that the ripe moment to initiate mediation is 
when the parties have reached what he refers to as a “mutually hurting stalemate”. A mutually 
hurting stalemate is characterised by a:  
“recent or impending catastrophe; the parties’ unilateral solutions are 
blocked making bilateral solutions conceivable; and power relations have 
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changed between the disputants in a way where the previously superior 
party begins to lose the upper hand and a rough power disparity emerges” 
(Zartman 2000, cited in Kleiboer, 1994, p 110).  
Conversely, Haass (1990) considers a conflict to be ripe for resolution when four prerequisites 
are met: a shared perception of the desirability of compromise, the ability of political leaders to 
agree to a desirable accord, compromises involved in agreements or peace plans must be 
presented in such a way that leaders of both sides can convince their respective constituencies 
that the national interest has been protected, combatants must agree on an acceptable procedure 
to further deal with their conflict (Hass 1990, cited in Kleiboer 1994, p 110). Hence, both 
Haass and Zartman agree that disputants need to feel as if they would be considerably worse 
off if they were unable to reach a settlement of some description.  
The ideas of both Zartman and Haass regarding ripeness suggest that for two key 
reasons, peace building efforts would not be most effective during a lull in hostilities. First, 
conflicts characterised by low or no hostilities clearly do not meet Zartman’s idea of an 
imminent catastrophe; in fact, it is likely that a lull in hostilities would represent the best 
conditions in the country for some time and hence the combatants might want to avoid 
anything which could threaten the stability of the status quo. Secondly, it would be difficult for 
leaders to convince their respective constituencies (who have already invested heavily in the 
conflict) that compromise was necessary at this stage given that the immediate threat would be 
relatively low.  
While a lull in hostilities may not fit the model of a conflict which is “ripe for 
resolution” it is clear that a break in hostilities does not represent a permanent end to a conflict. 
It is clear that further research into this dilemma is required so as to ensure that periods within 
a conflict where there are low or no fatalities become the status quo, rather than merely a lull in 
fighting.  
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Finding 3: Conflicts which are fought in Countries with Higher Levels of Ethno-
Linguistic Fractionalisation are more likely to Recur 
Perhaps the most surprising finding from this research is that high levels of ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation are positively correlated with civil war recurrence. Based on the 
findings of consulted literature, the majority of which has found that ethnic diversity alone 
does not increase a country’s susceptibility to civil war, it was originally hypothesised that this 
variable would not significantly influence civil war recurrence. Walter (2004) did not consider 
the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation in her study, however, she did take into account 
whether or not combatants were divided along ethnic lines. Walter found that wars fought 
between different ethnic groups were no more likely to recur than those involving participants 
from the same ethnic group.  
 Bearing in mind the assertion that ethnic diversity does not make a country any more 
prone to an initial outbreak of civil war, it is suggested that when conflict does rear its head in 
an ethnically diverse country, the ethnic complexity of the society alters the fabric of the 
conflict making it more susceptible to recurrence. This finding is in direct contradiction to the 
aforementioned findings of Walter (2004). However, Walter’s research was undertaken using a 
vastly different set of data which was defined by a much higher fatalities threshold. As a result 
this divergence in findings is not overly surprising.  
 Bearing in mind that ethnic diversity was not a major factor that increases the risk of an 
outbreak of civil war, why is it that ethnically diverse countries are more likely to experience 
recurring civil war? Vanhanen (1999, p 55) suggests that the “universality of ethnic conflict 
can be explained by our evolved predisposition to ethnic nepotism, which can be regarded as 
an extended form of nepotism”. Ethnic nepotism is defined simply as the tendency to favor kin 
over non-kin in terms of linguistic, national, racial, religious and other ethnic groups 
(Vanhanen 1999, p 57). Using this rationale, all ethnically diverse countries would be highly 
prone to civil war, yet, as it has already been mentioned, ethnic diversity alone has not been 
established as a factor which makes countries more susceptible to civil war. What has been 
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established is that regardless of the cause of civil wars, they are often organised along ethnic 
lines with ethnicity used as a propaganda tool to incite violence among those who were not 
previously enemies and to make the conflict appear to be the result of genuine grievances 
(Collier 2007, p 56; Sambanis 2001, p 263). As put by Collier (2007, p 56) “whether or not 
ethnic divisions are a cause of a conflict, they are likely to be a consequence of it”. As a result, 
an antagonistic ethnic dimension is added to many conflicts meaning that following the 
conclusion of the conflict, societies are trapped within the ethnic categories that the conflict 
determined.  
I argue that the ethnic division exacerbated during civil wars will generate a post-
conflict security dilemma, which will in turn significantly increase the likelihood of civil war 
recurrence. This is of course dependent on sufficient ethnic diversity existing in the society 
prior to the conflict emerging (without this, it would be difficult to organize combatants along 
ethnic lines). The proposed process by which ethnic diversity increases the risk of civil war 
recurrence is shown in Figure 5.2 (see page 100). It should be noted that this theory is only a 
speculative explanation for the finding that ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of civil war 
recurrence. Further empirical analysis would be required to determine whether or not security 
dilemmas are the primary causal mechanism in the recurrence of civil wars in ethnically 
diverse states. 
“Security dilemma” is a term which refers to the problem that emerges when one party 
(traditionally a state) inadvertently increases feelings of insecurity amongst other parties as a 
direct result of their attempts to improve their own security (Herz 1950, p 157). Although the 
term was originally used with reference to relations between states, in more recent years many 
scholars have applied the security dilemma concept to the different groups involved in civil 
wars (Collins 1998; Kaufmann 2007; Rose 2001). It is logical that an ethnic security dilemma 
might emerge within a state when one ethnic group attempts to increase their security and in 
doing so increases feelings of insecurity in other ethnic groups within that state. 
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Figure 5.2: Ethnic Diversity, Security Dilemmas, and Civil War Recurrence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All states have some level of ethnic diversity, however, because ethnic groups in most 
states will generally pursue their interests peacefully through established political channels, 
most states will not experience ethnic security dilemmas (Lake & Rothchild 1996, p 43). 
Ethnic security dilemmas come to the fore “when ethnicity is linked with acute social 
uncertainty, a history of conflict, and fear of what the future might bring” (Newland 1993, p 
161, cited in Lake and Rothchild, 1996, p 43 ). Hence, the wake of a conflict where 
participants were divided along ethnic lines is an ideal environment in which an ethnic security 
dilemma might emerge. When the memories of a past conflict are fresh in the mind and 
physical security remains of paramount concern it is unsurprising that ethnic groups will 
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attempt to increase their security. In doing so, it may be tempting for opposing factions to 
match or exceed their opposite’s power or to use force pre-emptively to ensure their security.    
The revelation that ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of civil war recurrence does 
not bode well with respect to peace building. Sambanis and Doyle (2000, pp 787-789) have 
found that ethnic and identity wars exhibit a significant negative correlation with peace 
building success. Ethnic conflicts are particularly intractable because ethnic identity is a very 
powerful association involving identity issues which are either difficult or impossible to 
change such as language, culture, religion, and parentage (Kaufmann 1996, p 138). Probably 
the most important implication of this finding is that policy makers concerned with the 
resolution of civil wars need to consider the ethnic dimensions of conflict very carefully and be 
aware that if conflict does break out in countries with a diverse society it is more likely to be 
complicated by additional problems at a later date, such as recurrence. It should also be 
remembered that although ethnic diversity has not been found to directly increase the 
likelihood of civil war outbreak, it still needs to be taken into consideration when addressing a 
conflict. If ethnic security dilemmas are a relevant factor in the re-emergence of civil wars one 
of the most important peace building tasks is to ensure that unbiased, objective information is 
made available to the relevant parties. This can help to increase the understanding of the 
positions of former enemies and prevent the build-up of false beliefs about opposing factions’ 
intentions (Lake & Rothchild 1996, p 74). 
 
Finding 4: Conflicts Arising over Territorial Issues are more likely to recur while 
Conflicts over Competition for the Control of Government are less likely to 
Recur 
 For two reasons it was hypothesised that territorial conflicts would be more likely to 
recur than those over competition for the control of government. First, it was suggested that 
identity issues (which have been proven to be much more difficult to resolve) are more likely 
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to be associated with territorial conflicts than governmental conflicts. Secondly, given that the 
victorious party in conflicts arising over competition for the control of government will 
generally take control of the state, it is likely that they will consolidate their dominance over 
their opposition and be unlikely to face challenges in the immediate future. Not only was this 
trend confirmed but it was revealed that territorial conflicts have a significant positive 
correlation with conflict recurrence while governmental conflicts are significantly negatively 
correlated with conflict recurrence. Disputed territorial issues were the root cause of 67.5% of 
conflicts which recurred while the remaining 32.5% of recurring conflicts were a result of 
competition to control government. When looking at conflicts which did not recur, the exact 
opposite proved to be the case. Competition for the control of government was the key 
incompatibility in 67.5% of these conflicts while territorial issues accounted for the remaining 
32.5% of non-recurring conflicts. Hence, with respect to peace building, conflicts fought over 
control of the government are not particularly worrying as far as recurrence is concerned. Once 
the conflict has ended the primary concern is that the victors manage their newly established 
control of the state responsibly.  
 Clearly, conflicts which arise over territorial issues are more concerning with regard to 
their likelihood of recurrence. The most obvious response to this problem would be the 
partition of states so that some territorial autonomy is granted. The issue of partition is a 
difficult one as it involves striking a balance between maintaining the integrity of states and the 
right to self-determination (Carment & Rowlands, 2004, pp 366-367). There are a number of 
academics who see partition as a viable option, particularly when ethnicity is a key factor in the 
conflict. Downes (2004; 2006) has found that conflicts which end by way of some form of 
compromise, such as a negotiated settlement, are nearly three times more likely to recur than 
those which end by way of a military victory. Furthermore, Downes’ (2006) findings show that 
of the negotiated settlements in civil wars that failed, every one occurred in a conflict in which 
ethnicity, as opposed to ideology, was the central line of cleavage. In the light of these findings, 
Downes (2006) suggests that the international community’s growing belief in the use of 
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negotiated settlements to resolve ethnically based civil wars may be unjustified. Accordingly, 
instead of negotiated settlements, a new approach is required. Downes (2006) advocates for a 
third party to help bring the conflict to an end not by negotiating a settlement but by helping 
one party to achieve a military victory. Where the third party intervened on the side of ethnic 
rebels, the military victory will result in partition which should be made as ethnically 
homogenous as possible.  
While initially appealing, this approach suffers from many of the problems presented 
earlier in this chapter: how will third parties decide which side to support, and what is stopping 
a fourth party from taking sides with another faction in the conflict leading to increased 
escalation? It should also be remembered that sheer weight of power will not ensure a rapid 
military victory in civil war. Given the guerrilla tactics which are prominent in many civil wars, 
a small number of lightly armed forces can potentially inflict significant damage to an 
opposition over a sustained period of time as was evident in the Sierra Leone conflict in the 
late 1990’s (Reno 2001). Additionally, while successful peace agreements are much more 
difficult to secure and much rarer than military outcomes, it is surely a better goal to try to 
resolve conflicts peacefully than to use further violence and the potential annihilation of one 
faction as a means of resolution. For these reasons, it is argued that partition by way of force as 
suggested by Downes (2006) is not a desirable response to civil wars, identity based or 
otherwise.  
 While partition as part of a military victory is not a desirable form of conflict 
management, should peace agreements provide provisions for some form of partition? 
Kaufmann (1996; 1998) advocates for partition along ethnic lines as a conflict management 
strategy in ethnic civil wars where the threat of violence is particularly severe. Kaufmann 
(1996) cites four cases supporting this reasoning: Bosnia and Croatia, Northern Ireland, 
Kashmir, and Palestine. In each of these cases, violence was greatly diminished following 
partition. Contrastingly, a subsequent study conducted by Mason and Fett (1996) finds that 
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ethnic conflicts are no more difficult to resolve by way of a peace agreement than other 
conflicts1. Hence, the feasibility of negotiated settlements in ethnic civil wars remains unclear. 
This research differentiated between conflicts which ended by way of a peace 
agreement, ceasefire, ceasefire with conflict regulation, military victory, low or no activity and 
all other forms of resolution. No differentiation was made between peace agreements which 
included provisions for partition and those which did not. However, in a study of a similar 
nature, Walter (2004) considered whether or not partition helped to reduce a country’s 
susceptibility to subsequent civil war. In contrast to Kaufmann’s (1996) predictions it was 
found that partition showed a strong positive correlation with civil war recurrence. While 
partition may lead to lower levels of violence between those parties which have been separated, 
Walter (2004, p 379) suggests that further violence in the country is likely as “government 
concessions over territory in one case appear to encourage additional challengers to initiate 
their own demands”. Given that the average country has between five and six ethnic groups 
which make up at least one percent of their country’s total population2 (Fearon, 2003), the 
potential for copycat conflicts is very high. Hence, as a general rule, partition cannot be 
considered as an effective means of conflict management. While it is effective in ending 
violence between the relevant parties it also increases the likelihood of future violence between 
different factions within the state.  
Assuming that partition and ensuring a military victory by means of adding strength to 
one party in a civil war are not a suitable means of conflict management, how should identity 
based territorial civil wars be resolved? Harff and Gurr (2004, p 186) argue that the best way to 
handle ethnic conflicts is through negotiations for autonomy within existing states. This is 
supported by the findings of Kauffman (1996) and Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) who 
have found that peace agreements which involve some form of territorial autonomy are more 
likely to succeed than those which do not. This is most easily achieved in states with some 
                                                 
1 For discussion regarding the divergent findings of Kauffman (1996) and Mason and Fett (1996) see Kuperman 
(2004, pp 343-346).  
2 For detailed discussion regarding the extent of ethnic diversity see Fearon (2003). 
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degree of democratic government because ethnic leaders can use the electoral process to gain 
influence in regional and national government. However, the mean Polity score for states 
which experience civil war is below zero indicating that most states which experience civil 
wars are generally non-democratic. This indicates that the peace building process may require 
not only a transition from fighting to peace, but also from autocracy to democracy and the 
difficulties of achieving the latter have also been well documented1. The gradual introduction 
of democracy would allow the opposition some inclusion in the decision making process of the 
state rather than being marginalised and repressed by the regime.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the problems associated with the implementation 
of civil war settlements are numerous. One of the primary difficulties in this period is 
convincing parties to move beyond the distrust created by a conflict and toward a self-
enforcing peace. According to Hoddie and Hartzell (2003, p 305), the best way to achieve this 
is by parties involved in a negotiated settlement making their commitment to peace “apparent 
and credible to all by sending signals that have unavoidable costs attached to them”. When 
parties have to sacrifice their own interests in pursuit of a peace settlement, their commitment 
to that settlement is likely to have much greater credibility and indicates a genuine 
commitment to the peace process. As mentioned earlier, the most effective commitment to the 
conciliatory process is the signing of a peace agreement which includes provisions for the 
mutual establishment of power-sharing and power-dividing institutions which divides state 
control amongst the former adversaries (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003, p 306). Another factor 
(which has also been discussed in greater detail earlier, see pages 93 – 94) which should be 
considered when attempting to initiate a peace agreement with power sharing is the benefit of 
third party security guarantees. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Diamond (1994)  
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion: Application of Findings and Policy 
Recommendations 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by revisiting the primary objectives of the research and considering 
the extent to which they have been accomplished. Findings from the research will then be 
applied to two civil wars which have recently ended: the conflict between the Government of 
Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge which ended in 1998 and the territorial conflict in the Aceh 
region between the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia which ended in 
2005 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2006). The purpose of this exercise is to show how the 
findings from this research can be applied to conflicts, both presently and in the future, to 
assess their risk of recurrence. Following this, the information gathered in this research will be 
used to present a number of recommendations on how conflicts can be managed so as to reduce 
their susceptibility to recurrence. The limitations of this research are identified and discussed 
with recommendations to overcome these limitations and suggestions for future research. 
Finally, the chapter will conclude with a brief summary of the findings from this research and 
discussion of the importance of continued civil war research.  
 
Objectives Revisited 
There were three primary objectives which this thesis aimed to address. The first was to 
develop a framework with which variables that might influence civil war recurrence could be 
tested. The second objective was to utilise this framework to isolate certain factors which are 
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correlated with civil war recurrence and then relate these findings to existing civil war research. 
The final objective was to analyse the most significant findings from this research and use this 
information to formulate post-conflict policy recommendations.  
With regard to the first of these objectives, after multi-variant analysis, the original 
Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence was narrowed down to include just a handful of the 
most important factors which are correlated with civil war recurrence (see Figure 6.1). All of 
these variables were positively associated with civil war recurrence (t=<0.05) when tested 
using multi-variant binary logistic regression. 
  
Figure 6.1: Revised Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence  
(showing statistically significant variables) 
 
     Antecedent Conditions                   Current Conditions   Consequent Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How do these Findings Relate to Civil War Literature? 
Most civil war research divides the incompatibility causing civil wars between whether 
or not the major causes involve identity issues such as ethnicity and religion. Several studies 
(Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001; Lake & Rothchild 1996; Sambanis & Doyle 2000) have 
shown that conflicts will be more difficult to resolve when they involve identity issues as it is 
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particularly difficult for combatants to compromise on these issues. This theory was supported 
by the findings of this research; territorial conflicts (which are deemed to be more likely to be 
tied to identity issues) are more likely to recur than conflicts which arose over competition for 
the control of government (which are less likely to involve identity issues).  
The second major finding from this research is that conflicts which occur in countries 
which have a high level of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) are more likely to recur. 
Most studies which have investigated the causes of civil war have found that ethnic diversity 
alone is not correlated with the outbreak of civil war. For this reason it was initially anticipated 
that ethnic diversity would not have a significant influence on civil war recurrence. However, 
the results showed a significant positive correlation between high ELF scores and civil war 
recurrence. The most likely explanation for this deviation is that different causal mechanisms 
are at work between when a conflict initially emerges and when a conflict recurs. When 
conflict does materialise in a diverse society an ethnic dimension may emerge within the 
conflict which complicates post-conflict peace building and hence increases countries’ 
susceptibility to civil war recurrence. This idea is supported by the findings of other research 
which found that ethnic diversity is negatively correlated with peace building success 
(Sambanis & Doyle 2000). 
The remaining findings illustrated in Figure 6.1 show that conflicts which end as a 
result of low or no activity are likely to recur while conflicts which end as a result of military 
victory generally do not recur. These findings supported the hypotheses and matched those of 
other findings in studies of a similar nature (Licklider 1995). Rather than representing the 
beginning of a permanent end to hostilities, it appears that conflicts which ‘end’ as a result of 
low or no activity are merely in hibernation as opposing factions do not have the necessary 
resources or will to continue significant hostilities, but the issues driving the original conflict 
remain unresolved. Alternately, when conflicts are ended by way of a decisive military victory, 
the defeated party’s morale and capability will often take a severe punishing while at the same 
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time the victorious party will usually gain control of the state and consolidate their power 
making the resumption of the same conflict in the immediate future very unlikely.  
In addition to these factors, several other variables were also correlated with civil war 
recurrence, albeit not as strongly as the variables shown in Figure 6.1. Another ten variables 
showed a noteworthy relationship with civil war recurrence. These are added into the revised 
version of the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Inclusive Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence 
(showing statistically significant variables and intermediate variables) 
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Application of Findings: Cambodia (Khmer Rouge) and Indonesia (Aceh) 
Before concluding, the findings of this research will be applied to two different 
conflicts, both of which have ended during the past ten years. This will serve as an example of 
how the findings from this research might be used to assess the risk of recurrence in future 
conflicts or conflicts which have recently ended. The conflict between the Government of 
Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge represents a good example of a conflict which, according to 
the findings in this research, will not recur.  
With regard to the major findings from this research, Cambodia fares well with respect 
to three out of four important indicators. First, the conflict was one which arose over 
competing claims for the control of government, not a territorial one. This means that identity 
issues are less likely to be involved in the conflict making recurrence less likely. Secondly, the 
conflict ended in 1998 with the surrender of remaining Khmer Rouge leadership (Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program 2006). Hence, the Government of Cambodia achieved a decisive 
victory which has been proven to be the most stable means by which conflicts end. Thirdly, in 
achieving military victory, the Government of Cambodia avoided allowing the conflict to 
stagnate and end as a result of low or no fatalities. The one major area of concern regarding the 
stability of peace in Cambodia is the country’s high level of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. 
Cambodia has an ELF score of 0.82 (Annett 2001, p 573) meaning it has high levels of 
diversity which was one variable which was strongly associated with civil war recurrence.  
Many of the intermediary indicators revealed in this research also show that the 
Cambodian civil war is unlikely to recur. First, the conflict in Cambodia had over 20,000 
fatalities during its 30 year history meaning that the conflict had a relatively high number of 
fatalities and level of intensity, both of which are negatively correlated with civil war 
recurrence. Secondly, during the 1990’s Cambodia received considerable assistance from the 
United Nations by way of an 18 month United Nations operation (United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia) which involved a deployment of 15,991 military personnel and 3,359 
civilian police at a cost of approximately 1.6 billion ($US). At the time, this was the most 
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expensive operation in the organisation’s history (United Nations 2006c). Thirdly, distance 
between Phnom Penh and the conflict’s epicentre was relatively low, Cambodia has a 
relatively small land area (181,040 km2), and the battle zone had a comparatively high radius 
as a proportion of Cambodia’s land area, all of which are factors that are negatively correlated 
with civil war recurrence. Hence, on the whole, the indications for Cambodia are very 
encouraging. Based on most of the important indicators revealed in this research, conflict 
between the Government and the Khmer Rouge is unlikely to re-emerge.  
 One conflict which has recently ended which, according to this research, is likely to 
recur, is the separatist conflict waged by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on the Indonesian 
Island of Sumatra. While the incompatibility had its roots as early as 1976, fatalities generated 
by the conflict did not reach 25 until 1990 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2006). In August 
2005 the conflict was officially terminated with the signing of The Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and GAM.  
The Aceh Civil War does not fare well when analysed considering the four major 
findings from this research. First, the primary incompatibility causing the conflict was a 
territorial one. GAM claims that if the region were allowed to use all the revenue from 
operations in the province, it would be able to establish an independent Muslim sultanate like 
nearby Brunei Darussalam (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2006). Hence this was a territorial 
conflict and involved identity issues. The findings of this research have shown that territorial 
conflicts are much more susceptible to recurrence than ones that arise over competition for the 
control of government. Secondly, this conflict was ended by way of a negotiated peace 
agreement. The evidence regarding the stability of negotiated settlements in civil wars shows 
only a very weak correlation between conflicts which were terminated through the signing of a 
peace agreement and non-recurrence. This form of termination is definitely not as stable as a 
military victory although it is the most stable alternative and is definitely better than a conflict 
ending as a result of low or no fatalities. A third concern with regard to this conflict is that 
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Indonesia has a very high level of ethnic diversity, 0.79, (Annett 2001, p 573) which is also 
strongly correlated with civil war recurrence.  
The Aceh Civil War also fares poorly when analysed in reference to the intermediary 
indicators revealed in this research. The conflict resulted in a low number of fatalities and 
intensity (around 500 per year), Indonesia has a large land area, and the central point of the 
conflict is a considerable distance from a major population centre, all of which are positively 
correlated with civil war recurrence. Additionally, there was no UN involvement in this 
conflict; however, the peace agreement which was signed in 2005 was negotiated with the help 
of a Finnish NGO called the Crisis Management Initiative (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
2006). Overall however, most of the important predictor variables that were revealed in this 
research indicate that the Aceh conflict has a high risk of recurrence in the next ten years.  
 The Cambodian and Indonesian conflicts serve as good examples of how this research 
can be applied to analyse conflicts which have recently ended or current and future conflicts. 
However, the purpose of this research was not simply to provide a framework by which the 
risk of civil war recurrence could be evaluated, but also to use this information to improve 
post-conflict peace building so the risk of civil war recurrence can be reduced. The analysis of 
the significant findings from this research has revealed some interesting results in this regard.   
 
Policy Recommendations 
 One of the major findings from this research is that conflicts which end as a result of 
military victory are less likely to recur while conflicts which end as a result of low or no 
activity are more likely to recur. The first policy implication which can be drawn from this 
finding is that a military victory should not necessarily be viewed as a bad thing. In some cases 
conflicts might be easily and rapidly concluded by way of a comprehensive show of force. 
While this method would involve some initial fatalities, it would ensure a rapid conclusion to 
the conflict and would deter other potential aggressors. Bearing this in mind, the analysis in the 
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previous chapter has revealed that in most cases it would be unwise for a third party to try to 
bring a conflict to a rapid conclusion by adding their strength to one side in a civil conflict.  
The finding that conflicts which end in low or no activity are likely to recur presents 
policy makers with a conundrum. On one hand, the conventional wisdom regarding the timing 
of interventions suggests that they will be most successful when both parties feel that they 
would be considerably worse off if some form of agreement is not reached (Zartman 2000; 
Hass 1995). Based on this logic, a period of low or no fatalities would definitely not be the best 
time to intervene. On the other hand, this research shows that a significant proportion of 
conflicts which end as a result of low or no activity will recur. Hence, the decision must be 
made as to whether interventions take place when they are most likely to be successful (as 
outlined by Zartman and Hass) or when they are most necessary (when conflicts end as a result 
of low or no fatalities). Given the sheer number of conflicts which appear to have ended but 
then recur, it is the author’s opinion that more effort must be made to initiate peace talks 
regardless of whether the conflict is considered “ripe” for resolution. Where conflicts have 
ended as a result of low or no fatalities and the combatants are no longer engaged in significant 
hostilities, policy makers should capitalise on the opportunity and ensure that the movement 
toward peace is maintained rather than leaving the conflict to stagnate and potentially recur.  
 The most interesting finding from this research was that ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation was positively correlated with civil war recurrence, meaning that civil wars 
are more likely to recur in countries which have greater levels of ethnic diversity. The 
emergence of ethnic security dilemmas is presented as a theoretical explanation for this 
phenomenon, however further research is required in this area as empirical analysis has not 
been conducted to test the validity of this theory. The major recommendation for policy makers 
which can be gained from this finding is simply that ethnic cleavages should not be overlooked 
in the post-conflict environment, even if ethnicity was not a key component of the initial 
outbreak of the conflict. If security dilemmas are a major factor contributing to the recurrence 
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of conflict in ethnically diverse societies, peace agreements which include provisions for power 
sharing and third party guarantors are likely to help overcome this problem. 
 The final major finding from this research is that conflicts which arise over territorial 
issues are positively correlated with recurrence while conflicts arising over competing claims 
for control of government are negatively correlated with recurrence. It is argued that partition 
is not a suitable peace building option as it may encourage additional conflicts from other 
separatist groups interested in succession. Instead, where territorial issues are severe, policy 
makers and other relevant actors should consider the option of promoting semi-autonomous 
regions within existing state borders.  
 Along with the aforementioned results, there were a number of other findings from this 
research which, while not statistically significant, will aid policy makers and other relevant 
actors when assessing the risk of civil war recurrence. Low intensity, large land area, high 
population, a small conflict radius relative to the size of the country and an isolated battle zone 
were all factors that are correlated with civil war recurrence. Conversely, UN involvement and 
conflicts ending by way of a peace agreement or a ceasefire with conflict regulation were both 
factors which are negatively correlated with civil war recurrence. Along with these factors, 
there were several variables which can be discounted in the sense that they have no or very 
minimal influence on civil war recurrence. Included in this category are the number of factions 
involved in the conflict, the regime type prior to the outbreak of conflict, the proximity of the 
battle zone to the nearest international border, the involvement of third parties and the 
percentage of the population living in rural areas. The combination of these findings will aid 
policy makers and other relevant actors when assessing the risk of civil war recurrence.  
Ideally, the UN and other interested third parties would take an active interest in all 
civil wars and try to ensure that they are brought to a stable and peaceful resolution. However, 
history has shown that this is not the case; in many cases countries receive little or no outside 
help in bringing conflicts to an end. Hence, these findings provide a useful tool to assess which 
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conflicts have the highest risk of recurrence and are in greatest need of assistance to ensure that 
recurrence does not occur.  
 
Limitations 
 As a whole, this research has achieved the objective of establishing factors which are 
correlated with civil war recurrence. However, there are limitations which should be kept in 
mind when considering the results of this research. First, the results which were obtained only 
pertain to the variables which were tested. There were important variables which might 
theoretically influence civil war recurrence which were not included in the analysis due to 
difficulties in obtaining reliable data. A good example of this is the extent to which third 
parties were involved in the post-conflict environment. It would seem logical to assume that 
where a third party takes an active interest in the resolution of a conflict, it would have some 
impact on the stability of any cessation in hostilities. Unfortunately, information relating to 
such a variable was not available and could not be collated and operationalised due to the large 
number of cases which are considered in this research. A future study which was either 
conducted on a larger scale or using a comparative case study approach with more detailed 
analysis of a smaller number of cases would overcome this problem.  
Problems caused by a lack of reliable data will be dramatically reduced in future civil 
war research due to the availability of Uppsala University’s Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research Database (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2006). This database includes highly 
detailed analysis of all civil wars using the same definition of civil war as that used in this 
research. Unfortunately, this data is only backdated as far as 1989, and thus could not be 
utilised in this research.1 
 A second limitation of this research is that it only considers variables pertaining to the 
nature of the civil war and the immediate post-conflict environment (the post-conflict regime 
                                                 
1 Given that this research only considers conflicts which ended prior to 1995, use of Uppsala University’s 
Department of Peace and Conflict Research Database would severely limit the size of the sample.  
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type, how the conflict was concluded, whether or not there was UN involvement, and whether 
a peace agreement was signed). This research could be expanded by including a consideration 
of variables associated with the living conditions in the years following the cessation of 
hostilities. This would enable the study to test Walter’s (2004) hypothesis that the risk of 
conflict recurrence will be inversely proportional to the quality of post-conflict living 
conditions. The Polity variable which measures the regime type of the country prior to the 
conflict breaking out and in the period following the conflict was the only measure of how the 
post-conflict living conditions influence the likelihood of conflict recurrence. The inclusion of 
proxy variables measuring pre and post-conflict living conditions in the analysis would provide 
a more accurate depiction of how societal changes caused by the conflict would influence the 
likelihood of civil war recurrence.   
 This research is also limited in the sense that it only considered the problem of civil war 
recurrence where the second episode of the conflict was essentially the same as the first.1 
While this in itself is not a problem it does limit the usefulness of the research. This research 
has established a number of factors which will make a conflict more or less likely to recur, 
however it gives no indication of whether or not the characteristics of the conflict make the 
country in question susceptible to further conflict involving different factions with different 
objectives. Hence, using these findings it could be concluded that a particular conflict has a 
very low risk of recurrence when in reality the effects of the conflict might leave the country 
particularly susceptible to the emergence of another conflict involving different participants. 
This problem could be overcome by conducting this research using a similar methodology but 
with two definitions of civil war: the one used in this research along with another more general 
definition which simply includes any future conflict. This would facilitate a much clearer 
                                                 
1 The rationale for using this approach is that where conflict is followed by another conflict within ten years, over 
60% of the subsequent conflicts involve the same factions and incompatibilities as the preceding conflict. 
Therefore, the primary security concern facing countries in the wake of a civil war is that the same conflict does 
not recur.  
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indication of what causes a country to become a victim of the “conflict trap” and hence a 
clearer conception of how this problem can be avoided.  
 This research also suffers from the magnitude of the issue under consideration. Given 
the large number of cases and relevant variables, it was difficult to conduct the research with 
the detail that would have been preferable within the time restraints imposed upon this study. 
In order to produce a meaningful piece of research, it was necessary to isolate a very specific 
element of the broader post-civil war field. In this regard, this research has really only scraped 
the surface when it comes to determining how sustainable peace can be restored in post-
conflict societies. What is needed in this field is a comprehensive study which combines the 
research conducted in this study with analysis of recurring civil war in general (not just 
recurrence of conflicts involving the same factions and incompatibilities) and other elements of 
post-conflict peace building including the role of third parties, negotiations and peace 
agreements, socio-economic development, political transition and democratisation, social 
reconciliation, and demobilisation.  
 
The Importance of Continued Civil War Research  
This research represents only a very small contribution to an increasingly sizeable body 
of literature concerning civil war. Given the significance of the problem caused by civil wars, it 
is important that research in this field remains one of the primary focuses in the Political 
Science discipline. A commonly used definition of the term “conflict” suggests that conflict 
arises from the “mutual recognition of competing or incompatible material interests and basic 
values and ... conflict is a pervasive feature of all social relations” (Dixon 1996, p 655). Given 
that conflict is “a pervasive feature of all social relations” the idea of attempting to eliminate 
conflict altogether is as noble as it is unrealistic. Instead we must focus on building 
mechanisms through which conflict can be managed in a non-violent manner. However, given 
the proclivity for conflicts to evolve into violent civil wars it is also necessary to be realistic 
and for contingency plans to be available in an effort to limit the adverse effects of civil wars 
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should they occur. This research aimed to achieve this by investigating why some conflicts 
which appear to have ended will recur several years later. In spite of the aforementioned 
limitations, this research has provided some interesting and useful findings regarding civil war 
recurrence.    
At the start of this research, the introductory chapter discusses the disastrous 
consequences which civil wars continue to generate in many countries across the globe. In 
spite of the harm which civil war causes and the considerable academic and practical efforts 
aimed at resolving violent conflict, civil war remains one of major scourges facing humanity in 
the 21st century. As put by former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar; 
 “Peace is, and has always been, the ultimate human aspiration ... yet our 
history overwhelmingly shows that while we speak incessantly of peace, our 
actions tell a very different story”.  
For this reason, it is crucial that the horrors of civil war are not endured on multiple occasions 
and the pattern of civil war recurrence is not allowed to continue.  
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Appendix A 
 
Bercovitch’s Contingency Framework 
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Appendix B 
 
Conflicts Included in Analysis 
 
 
Government/Location1 Primary Opposition 
Group 
Recur? Start End Fatalities 
Angola, Cuba UNITA , South Africa, 
FNLA , Zaire 
Yes 1975 1995 143000 
Angola FLEC-R Yes 1991 1991 125 
Angola FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R Yes 1994 1994 125 
Angola FLEC-FAC Yes 1996 1998 250 
Angola FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R Yes 2002 2002 315 
Argentina Military faction Yes 1955 1955 900 
Burundi Palipehutu Yes 1991 1992 750 
Cambodia KR Yes 1967 1969 71428 
Chad MDD Yes 1991 1994 999 
China Tibet Yes 1950 1950 5000 
China Tibet Yes 1956 1956 4000 
Congo-Brazzaville Cobras, Ninjas Yes 1993 1994 175 
Croatia Serbian irregulars, 
Serbian Republic of 
Krajina, Yugoslavia 
Yes 1992 1993 6666 
Djibouti FRUD Yes 1991 1994 400 
Eritrea EIJM Yes 1997 1997 71 
Eritrea EIJM Yes 1999 1999 236 
Ethiopia, Cuba WSLF Yes 1975 1983 38000 
Ethiopia ONLF Yes 1996 1996 173 
Ethiopia ONLF Yes 1998 2002 692 
Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami Yes 1996 1997 50 
Ethiopia OLF Yes 1989 1991 300 
Georgia Republic of S. Ossetia Yes 1992 1992 950 
India CPI Yes 1948 1951 2400 
India PWG Yes 1990 1994 981 
India NNC Yes 1956 1959 342 
India NSCN (I-M) Yes 1992 2000 912 
                                                 
1 The country that is listed first is the country where the civil war was fought. Additional countries listed in this 
column were also involved in the civil war on the side of the government. 
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India ATTF Yes 1992 1993 63 
India NLFT Yes 1995 1995 442 
India PLA Yes 1982 1988 539 
India PLA Yes 1992 1993 231 
India PLA Yes 1995 1996 77 
India PLA Yes 1995 1996 77 
India PLA Yes 1995 1996 77 
India PLA Yes 1998 1998 77 
India PLA Yes 2000 2000 77 
India UNLF Yes 1994 1994 71 
India UNLF, KNF Yes 1997 1997 71 
India UNLF Yes 1999 1999 71 
India UNLF Yes 2003 2003 71 
India ULFA Yes 1990 1991 239 
Indonesia Darul Islam Movement Yes 1953 1953 1000 
Indonesia OPM Yes 1965 1965 100 
Indonesia OPM Yes 1967 1969 8500 
Indonesia Fretilin Yes 1975 1989 33275 
Indonesia Fretilin Yes 1992 1992 50 
Indonesia GAM Yes 1990 1991 909 
Iran KDPI Yes 1990 1990 50 
Iran KDPI Yes 1993 1993 125 
Iran Mujahideen e Khalq Yes 1979 1982 7400 
Iran Mujahideen e Khalq Yes 1986 1988 1200 
Iran Mujahideen Khalq Yes 1991 1993 405 
Iran Mujahideen Khalq Yes 1997 1997 165 
Iraq SCIRI Yes 1982 1984 145 
Iraq SCIRI Yes 1987 1987 36 
Iraq KDP Yes 1961 1970 50000 
Iraq KDP Yes 1973 1993 40500 
Laos Pathet Lao, Neutrals Yes 1959 1961 5000 
Malaysia CPM Yes 1974 1975 200 
Myanmar KNU Yes 1948 1992 1421 
Myanmar KNU Yes 1995 1995 323 
Myanmar ABSDF Yes 1990 1992 1310 
Myanmar Arakan Insurgents Yes 1948 1988 1048 
Myanmar ARIF, RSO Yes 1991 1992 26 
Myanmar NMSP Yes 1990 1990 58 
Myanmar KNPP Yes 1992 1992 238 
Myanmar SSA, SSIA Yes 1960 1970 4321 
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Myanmar SSNPLO, SSRA, PSLO, 
MTA 
Yes 1976 1988 5186 
Pakistan MQM Yes 1990 1990 25 
Papua New Guinea BRA Yes 1989 1990 117 
Philippines MNLF Yes 1972 1990 41028 
Russia Republic of Chechnya 
(Ichkeria) 
Yes 1994 1996 45500 
Senegal MFDC Yes 1990 1990 200 
Senegal MFDC Yes 1992 1993 200 
Senegal MFDC Yes 1995 1995 200 
Senegal MFDC Yes 1997 2001 200 
Spain ETA Yes 1980 1981 121 
Spain ETA Yes 1987 1987 52 
Sri Lanka JVP Yes 1971 1971 1630 
Sri Lanka LTTE, TELO, PLOTE Yes 1983 2001 60000 
Sudan SPLM Yes 1983 1996 55500 
Uganda UPA Yes 1972 1972 200 
Uganda, Libya Military faction, UNLA , 
Tanzania 
Yes 1978 1979 100 
Uganda NRA, UFM, UPM, 
UNRF, UFDM, UPF, 
UPDA, UPC, UNLA, 
FOBA 
Yes 1981 1991 107700 
United Kingdom PIRA Yes 1971 1991 3271 
USA led coalition al-Qaida (The Base) Yes 2001 2002 5495 
Algeria Takfir wa┤Hijra No 1991 1991 39 
Argentina Military faction No 1963 1963 25 
Argentina ERP , Montoneros No 1973 1977 2984 
Azerbaijan Republic of Nagorno-
Karabakh, Armenia 
No 1992 1994 19200 
Azerbaijan Husseinov military 
faction 
No 1993 1993 60 
Azerbaijan OPON forces No 1994 1994 80 
Bangladesh JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini No 1974 1992 3500 
Bolivia Popular Revolutionary 
Movement 
No 1946 1946 1009 
Bolivia MNR No 1952 1952 600 
Bolivia ELN No 1967 1967 82 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbian Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbian irregulars, 
Yugoslavia 
No 1992 1994 23571 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Autonomous Province of No 1992 1995 15714 
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Western Bosnia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatian Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Croatian 
irregulars 
No 1993 1994 15714 
Burkina Faso Popular Front No 1987 1987 100 
Burundi Military faction No 1965 1965 50 
Cambodia, US, 
S.Vietnam 
FUNK, North Vietnam No 1970 1975 156250 
Cambodia KNUFNS, Vietnam No 1978 1978 4575 
Cameroon Military faction No 1984 1984 500 
Chad Various groups, Libya No 1965 1988 28000 
Chad Military faction , 
MOSANAT, Islamic 
Legion 
No 1989 1990 5800 
Chile Military faction No 1973 1973 2095 
China Peoples Liberation Army No 1946 1949 1200000 
China Taiwanese insurgents No 1947 1947 1000 
China Tibet No 1959 1959 67000 
Comoros Presidential guard No 1989 1989 27 
Congo/Zaire Katanga No 1960 1962 683 
Congo/Zaire Independent Mining State 
of South Kasai 
No 1960 1962 300 
Congo/Zaire CNL No 1964 1965 29965 
Congo/Zaire Opposition militias No 1967 1967 778 
Congo/Zaire FLNC No 1977 1978 919 
Costa Rica National Liberation Army No 1948 1948 2000 
Croatia Serbian Republic of 
Krajina 
No 1994 1994 7857 
Cuba Military faction No 1953 1953 28 
Cuba Movimiento 26 De Julio: 
26th of July Movement 
No 1957 1958 5000 
Cuba National Revolutionary 
Council, USA 
No 1961 1961 279 
Dominican Republic Military faction No 1965 1965 3276 
El Salvador Military faction No 1972 1972 300 
El Salvador ERP , FAL, FARN, FPL, 
PRTC 
No 1979 1979 54850 
El Salvador FMLN No 1980 1991 150 
Equatorial Guinea Military faction No 1979 1979 185 
Ethiopia Military faction No 1960 1960 662 
Ethiopia EPRP, TPLF , EPDM,  
OLF 
No 1976 1991 16000 
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Ethiopia ELF , ELF factions, EPLF No 1962 1991 200000 
Ethiopia ALF No 1989 1991 300 
Gabon, France Military faction No 1964 1964 30 
Gambia, Senegal SRLP No 1981 1981 650 
Georgia Anti-government alliance No 1991 1993 191 
Georgia Republic of Abkhazia No 1992 1993 3000 
Ghana Military faction No 1966 1966 27 
Ghana Military faction No 1981 1981 50 
Ghana Military faction No 1983 1983 26 
Greece DSE No 1946 1949 154000 
Guatemala Military faction No 1949 1949 40 
Guatemala Forces of Carlos Castillo 
Armas 
No 1954 1954 48 
Guatemala MR-13 , FAR , EGP , 
PGT , ORPA 
No 1965 1987 42250 
Guatemala URNG No 1988 1995 4050 
Guinea Military faction No 1970 1970 300 
Haiti Leopard Corps No 1989 1989 30 
Haiti Tonton Macoute, Engine 
Lourd 
No 1991 1991 250 
Hyderabad CPI No 1947 1948 2000 
India CPI (-Marxist) No 1967 1972 300 
India MNF No 1966 1968 1500 
India TNV No 1978 1988 632 
India Sikh insurgents No 1983 1993 18875 
India ABSU No 1989 1990 239 
Indonesia Republic of South 
Moluccas 
No 1950 1950 5000 
Indonesia PRRI, Permesta 
movement, Darul Islam 
Movement 
No 1958 1961 33444 
Indonesia OPM No 1976 1978 8500 
Iran KDPI No 1994 1994 125 
Iran Republic of Azerbaijan, 
Soviet Union 
No 1946 1946 50 
Iran APCO No 1979 1980 200 
Iraq Military faction No 1958 1958 25 
Iraq Nationalists No 1959 1959 2000 
Iraq Military faction No 1963 1963 350 
Kenya Military faction No 1982 1982 318 
Laos, US, South Vietnam Pathet Lao, North 
Vietnam 
No 1963 1973 18500 
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Laos LRM No 1989 1990 25 
Lebanon Independent Nasserite 
Movement /Mourabitoun 
militia 
No 1958 1958 1400 
Lebanon Various organizations, 
Syria, Israel 
No 1975 1990 144000 
Liberia Military faction No 1980 1980 27 
Liberia NPFL No 1989 1994 23500 
Madagascar Monima National 
Independence Movement 
No 1971 1971 128 
Malaysia CPM No 1981 1981 25 
Malaysia CCO No 1963 1966 400 
Mali MPA No 1990 1990 200 
Mali FIAA No 1994 1994 400 
Mexico EZLN No 1994 1994 145 
Moldova Dniestr Republic No 1992 1992 650 
Morocco Military faction No 1971 1971 264 
Morocco, Mauritania POLISARIO No 1975 1989 13000 
Mozambique Renamo No 1977 1992 145400 
Myanmar BCP, leftist organisations No 1948 1988 24883 
Myanmar ABSDF No 1994 1994 336 
Myanmar RSO No 1994 1994 26 
Myanmar PNDF No 1949 1949 600 
Myanmar KIO No 1961 1992 19213 
Nepal Nepali Congress No 1960 1962 250 
Nicaragua FSLN No 1978 1979 10000 
Nicaragua Contras/FDN No 1981 1989 30000 
Niger FLAA No 1992 1992 366 
Niger CRA No 1994 1994 34 
Nigeria Military faction No 1966 1966 25 
Nigeria Republic of Biafra No 1967 1970 75000 
Muscat and Oman, UK State of Oman/Free Oman No 1957 1957 32 
Oman, Iran, Jordan, UK PFLOAG, South Yemen No 1972 1975 2000 
Pakistan Mukti Bahini: Liberation 
Force 
No 1971 1971 50000 
Pakistan Baluchi separatists No 1974 1977 8800 
Panama Military faction No 1989 1989 200 
Paraguay Opposition coalition 
(Febreristas, Liberals and 
Communists) 
No 1947 1947 4000 
Paraguay Military faction No 1954 1954 50 
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Paraguay Military faction No 1989 1989 200 
Peru MIR, T·pac Amaru,  ELN No 1965 1966 138 
Philippines HUK No 1946 1954 9000 
Philippines MNLF No 1993 1993 95 
Rhodesia ZANU , ZAPU No 1972 1979 27000 
Romania National Salvation Front No 1989 1989 909 
Russia Parliamentary forces No 1993 1993 193 
Rwanda, Zaire FPR No 1990 1994 5500 
Saudi Arabia Juhayman Movement No 1979 1979 269 
Somalia Military faction No 1978 1978 520 
South Africa SWAPO No 1966 1988 25000 
South Africa ANC, PAC, Azapo No 1981 1988 4000 
South Korea, USA Leftist insurgents (e.g. 
Inmin-gun: Peoples 
Army, military faction) 
No 1948 1950 31525 
South Vietnam FNL No 1955 1964 2097705 
Soviet Union Forest Brothers No 1946 1948 667 
Soviet Union LTS(p)A, LNJS, and 
LNPA 
No 1946 1947 735 
Soviet Union BDPS No 1946 1948 8620 
Soviet Union UPA No 1946 1950 17769 
Soviet Union Republic of Armenia, 
ANM 
No 1990 1991 800 
Soviet Union Azerbaijani Popular Front No 1990 1990 142 
Spain ETA No 1991 1992 72 
Sudan Anya Nya No 1963 1972 20000 
Sudan Sudanese Communist 
Party 
No 1971 1971 38 
Sudan Islamic Charter Front No 1976 1976 300 
Surinam SLA/Jungle Commando No 1986 1988 300 
Syria Military faction No 1966 1966 300 
Syria Muslim Brotherhood No 1979 1982 15450 
Thailand Military faction (Navy) No 1951 1951 25 
Thailand CPT No 1974 1982 7454 
Togo MTD No 1986 1986 30 
Trinidad and Tobago Jamaat al-Muslimeen No 1990 1990 30 
Tunisia RΘsistance ArmΘe 
Tunisienne 
No 1980 1980 41 
Turkey Devrimci Sol No 1991 1992 50 
Uganda Military faction No 1971 1971 60 
Uganda Military faction No 1977 1977 100 
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Uruguay MLN/Tupamaros No 1972 1972 53 
Venezuela Military faction No 1962 1962 400 
Venezuela Military faction No 1992 1992 183 
Yemen Democratic Republic of 
Yemen 
No 1994 1994 5500 
Yemen (North) Opposition coalition No 1948 1948 4000 
Yemen (North), Egypt Royalists No 1962 1970 50000 
Yemen (North) National Democratic 
Front 
No 1980 1982 400 
Yemen (South) Faction of Yemenite 
Socialist Party 
No 1986 1986 11500 
Yugoslavia Republic of Slovenia No 1991 1991 63 
Yugoslavia Republic of Croatia, 
Croatian irregulars 
No 1991 1991 2000 
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Appendix C 
 
The Involvement of Third Parties in Civil War 
 
Foreign Involvement in Recurring Civil Conflicts 
Date Side A (Government) Side B (Opposition) 
1978-79 Libya Tanzania 
1975-95 Cuba South Africa, Zaire 
1975-83 Cuba  
1992-93  Yugoslavia, Serbian Republic of Krajina 
2001 Coalition of the Willing  
 
Foreign Involvement in Non-Recurring Civil Conflicts 
Date Side A (Government) Side B (Opposition) 
1946  Soviet Union, Azerbaijan 
1948-50 USA  
1962-70 Egypt  
1961  USA 
1957 UK  
1975-90  Syria, Israel 
1963-73 USA, South Vietnam  
1964 France  
1965-88  Libya 
1970-75 USA, South Vietnam North Vietnam 
1978  Vietnam 
1972-75 Iran, Jordan, UK South Yemen 
1975-89 Mauritania  
1981 Senegal  
1990-94 Zaire  
1992-94  Armenia, Republic of Nagorno 
1992-94  Yugoslavia, Serbian Republic 
1993-94  Croatia, Croatian Rep. of Bosnia & Herzegovina  
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